Don\u27t End or Audit the Fed: Central Bank Independence in an Age of Austerity by Buchanan, Neil H. & Dorf, Michael C.
Cornell University Law School
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
11-2016
Don't End or Audit the Fed: Central Bank
Independence in an Age of Austerity
Neil H. Buchanan
George Washington University Law School
Michael C. Dorf
Cornell Law School, michaeldorf@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Neil H. Buchanan and Michael C. Dorf, "Don't End or Audit the Fed: Central Bank Independence in an Age of Austerity," 102 Cornell
Law Review (2016)
DON'T END OR AUDIT THE FED:
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE IN
AN AGE OF AUSTERITY
Neil H. Buchanant & Michael C. Dorft
The Federal Reserve (the Fed) is the central bank of the
United States. Because of its power and importance in guid-
ing the economy, the Fed's independence from direct political
influence has made it a target of ideologically motivated at-
tacks throughout its history, with an especially aggressive
round of attacks coming in the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis and ongoing today. We defend Fed independence. We
point to the Fed's exemplary performance during and after the
2008 crisis, and we offer the example of a potential future
crisis in which Congress falls to increase the debt ceiling to
show how the Fed's independence makes it the only entity
that can minimize the damage during crises (both market-
driven and policy-induced). We further argue that the Fed's
independence is justifted to prevent self-dealing by politicians,
even when no crisis is imminent. Although the classic justifi-
cation for Fed independence focuses on the risk that political
actors will keep interest rates lower than appropriate for the
long-term health of the economy, we show that Fed indepen-
dence addresses the risk of self-dealing and other pathologies
even when, as now, political actors favor tighter monetary
policy than appropriate for the long-term health of the
economy.
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INTRODUCTION
During the financial crisis of 2008 and for much of the
deep recession that followed, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (the Fed)' took crucial steps to prevent
the United States and the global economy from falling into a
depression. Elected officials also acted. The Bush administra-
tion quickly devised the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP),
which Congress first rejected but then enacted. 2 In its first
1 Congress established the Federal Reserve System in 1913 to serve as the
central bank of the United States. The Fed's key functions include formulating
the country's monetary policy, maintaining the stability of the financial system,
containing systemic risks, regulating financial institutions, and providing various
financial services to depository financial institutions and to the federal govern-
ment. The Fed consists of a central, independent government agency (the Board
of Governors), the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), and twelve regional
Federal Reserve Banks. The Board of Governors and the FOMC effectuate mone-
tary policy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-
term interest rates. See 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2012); FED. RESERVE SYS., ROLES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF FEDERAL RESERVE DIRECTORS 11 (2013), http://www.federalre
serve.gov/aboutthefed/directors/pdf/roles-responsibilitiesFINALwebO 13013.
pdf [https://perma.cc/KE87-PB67].
2 The first version of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, debated in
the House as H.R. 3997, was voted down 228-205 on September 29, 2008. See
On Concurring in Senate Amendment with an Amendment: H.R. 3997 to Amend the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to Provide Earnings Assistance and Tax Relief to
members of the Uniformed Services, Volunteer Firefighters, and Peace Corps
Volunters, and for Other Purposes, GovTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress
/votes/ 110-2008/h674 [https://perma.cc/K46D-CNZG] (vote tally). A second
2 [Vol. 102: 1
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months in office, the Obama Administration sought and ob-
tained a substantial package of spending aimed at stimulating
the economy.3 And building on efforts begun by President
Bush, President Obama rescued the U.S. automobile industry
by arranging for federal government-backed debtor-in-posses-
sion financing for General Motors.4 Yet these efforts were mod-
est in scale relative to those of the Fed.5 Moreover, after
Republicans in Congress succeeded in limiting the size of the
fiscal stimulus program such that it was too small from the
outset,6 politicians of both parties too quickly set their sights
on deficit reduction.7 Tea Party-affiliated congressional Repub-
version, H.R. 1424, passed the Senate on October 1, 2008 and the House
263-171 on October 3, 2008. See H.R. 1424 (110th): Paul Wellstone Mental Health
and Addiction Equity Act of 2007, GovTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/
votes/i 10-2008/h681 [https://perma.cc/QF6P-E8EV (vote tally for bill creating
TARP).
3 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No 111-5,
123 Stat. 115 (2009).
4 See In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 480 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009);
CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE USE OF TARP FUNDS IN
THE SUPPORT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE DOMESTIc AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 4-19
(2009), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg51964/html/CHRG-111
shrg51964.htm [https://perma.cc/8J62-GD9S); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2009 144-49 (2009), http://www.treasury.
gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Mgt/Documents/09AFR Treasury
Tagged_07.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5NU-TrNL]; PRESIDENT'S AUTO TASK FORCE,
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION NEW PATH TO VIABILITY FOR GM & CHRYSLER 2-3, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/FactSheetGMChrysler-FIN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/72UP-KR6U]; Brent J. Horton, The TARP Bailout of GM: A Le-
gal, Historical, and Literary Critique, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 217, 249 (2010).
5 Monetary policy was roughly an order of magnitude larger than fiscal pol-
icy. See generally CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE FINAL
REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL 162-64 (2011), http://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg64832/pdf/CHRG-112shrg64832.pdf [https://
perma.cc/EH46-G6ZX (quantifying measures taken by the Fed); OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, SIG-QR-09-03,
QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 4, 38, 140, 152, 156 (2009), http://www.sigtarp.
gov/Quarterly/20Reports/July2O09-QuarterlyReportLtoCongress.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/R44J-WZ6U] (quantifying TARP assistance and Fed programs).
6 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Opinion, Franklin Delano Obama?, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 10, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/opinion/10krugman.
html [https://perma.cc/WEP6-CLED]; Paul Krugman, Opinion, Let's Get Fiscal,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2008) http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/17/opinion/17
krugman.html [https://perma.cc/T24W-4XVF]; Lawrence Summers, Opinion,
Mr. Obama's Stimulus Plan Must Aim for Long-Term Results, WASH. POST (Dec. 28,
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/26/
AR2008122601299.html?nav=HCmoduletmv [https://perma.cc/S243-3FDJ] ("In
this crisis, doing too little poses a greater threat than doing too much.").
7 See Budget Committee Mid-Session Hearings Fiscal Year 2014: Hearing on
the Impact of Political Uncertainty on Jobs and the Economy Before the S. Comm. on
the Budget, 113th Cong. 751 (2013) (testimony of Chad Stone, Chief Economist,
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
113shrg85902/pdf/CHRG-113shrg85902.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC5X-4LA5];
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licans repeatedly threatened not to raise the debt ceiling-and
thus raised the specter of a first-ever default by the government
of the United States-in order to obtain deep cuts in govern-
ment spending.8 With the political system thus deploying fiscal
policy at first too timidly and then counterproductively, it was
left to the Fed to steer the economy through recovery via mone-
tary policy.
The Fed answered the call. In the early days of the crisis,
the Fed interpreted its statutory mandate to permit bailouts
of key firms,9 and for years thereafter the Fed kept real inter-
Spend Less, Owe Less, Grow the Economy: Hearing Before the Joint Econ. Comm.,
112th Cong. (2011) (testimony of Chad Stone, Chief Economist, Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities) https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg67929/
pdf/CHRG-112shrg67929.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TY4-Z7VJ; Neil H. Buchanan,
Good Deficits: Protecting the Public Interest from Deficit Hysteria, 31 VA. TAX REV.
75, 78 (2011) [hereinafter Buchanan, Good Deficits]; Neil H. Buchanan, Finally,
Prominent Economists Are Admitting that the Policy Debate Should Not Focus on the
Debt and Deficit: The Folly of Thinking Too Far Ahead, JUsTICIA.coM: VERDICT (Jan.
31, 2013), https://verdict.justia.com/2013/01/31/finally-prominent-econo-
mists-are-admitting-that-the-policy-debate-should-not-focus-on-the-debt-and-
deficit [https://perna.cc/6NG5-FHPF]; Jon Hilsenrath, Course of Economy
Hinges on Fight over Stimulus, WALL ST. J. (July 26, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704720004575376923163437134
[https://perma.ce/LXM7-VBS4] (quoting Rep. Paul Ryan rejecting government
intervention); Christina Romer, Now Isn't the Time to Cut the Deficit, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/24/business/24view.html
?_r=0 [https://perma.c/Z9WR-UHCE].
8 See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Debt Ceiling: When Negotiating over Spending and Tax Laws, Congress and the
President Should Consider the Debt Ceiling a Dead Letter, 113 COLuM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 32, 33 (2013) [hereinafter Buchanan & Dorf, Bargaining in the Shadow];
Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Borrowing by Any Other Name: Why Presi-
dential "Spending Cuts" Would Still Exceed the Debt Ceiling, 114 COLuM. L. REv.
SIDEBAR 26, 31-33 (2014) [hereinafter Buchanan & Dorf, Borrowing by Any Other
Name]; Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitu-
tional Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff
112 COLUM. L. REv. 1175, 1176 (2012) [hereinafter Buchanan & Dorf, How to
Choose]; Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Nullifying the Debt Ceiling Threat
Once and for All: Why the President Should Embrace the Least Unconstitutional
Option, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 237, 240 (2012) [hereinafter Buchanan &
Dorf, Nullifying the Debt Ceiling Threat]; Jonathan Weisman, Republicans Pledge
New Standoff onDebtLimit, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/05/16/us/politics/gop-pledges-new-standoff-on-debt-limit.html?r=0
[https://perma.c/K9MX-PPG3] (reporting House Speaker John Boehner's vow to
oppose any increase in the debt ceiling unless it was offset by spending cuts).
9 Jos6 Gabilondo, Financial Hospitals: Defending the Fed's Role as a Market
Maker ofLast Resort, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 731, 783-85 (2013); Thomas 0. Porter,
II, Note & Comment, The Federal Reserve's Catch-22: A Legal Analysis of the
Federal Reserve's Emergency Powers, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 483, 485, 504-05
(2009). Contra Chris Isidore, Why They Let Lehman Die, CNN MONEY (Sept. 15,
2008, 4:54 PM), http: //money.cnn.com/2008/09/15/news/companies/why
bearnot lehman/ [https://perma.cc/9L4V-K68Z].
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est rates negative to flood the economy with essential
liquidity.10
Yet the Fed was not rewarded with anything like universal
praise. On the contrary, in recent years, Fed critics on both the
left and the right have issued calls to "end" or "audit" the Fed.11
The substantive criticisms include the following: The Fed exer-
cises power in excess of its statutory mandate, as when it cre-
ated special purpose vehicles to bail out troubled firms during
the early days of the financial crisis;1 2 it creates money "out of
thin air," as when it pursued its policy of "quantitative easing"
to stimulate the economy during the deep recession that fol-
lowed that crisis; 13 by design and in practice, it favors the
10 See generally Brett W. Fawley & Christopher J. Neely, Four Stories of Quan-
titative Easing, 95 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REv. 51 (2013), https://research.st
louisfed.org/publications/review/13/01/Fawley.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D4M-
QAA7] (describing central bank policies for providing monetary stimulus below
the so-called zero lower bound of interest rates).
11 See, e.g., Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2013, S. 209, 113th Cong.
(2013) (calling for "a full audit of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System and the Federal reserve banks by the Comptroller General of the United
States"); RON PAUL, END THE FED 141 (2009) ("The Federal Reserve should be
abolished because it is immoral, unconstitutional, impractical, promotes bad eco-
nomics, and undermines liberty."); MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42079,
FEDERAL RESERVE: OVERSIGHT AND DISCLOSURE ISSUEs 6-12 (2016) [hereinafter LA-
BONTE, FEDERAL RESERVE: OVERSIGHT AND DISCLOSURE ISSuEs] (describing recent en-
acted and proposed legislation concerning increased oversight and disclosure
requirements for Fed activities); Chad Emerson, The Illegal Actions of the Federal
Reserve: An Analysis of How the Nation's Central Bank Has Acted Outside the Law
in Responding to the Current Financial Crisis, 1 Wm. & MARY BUS. L. REv. 109, 133
(2010) (arguing that the Fed should be subject to "a comprehensive and indepen-
dent audit"); Lisa Lerer & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Romney Calls for Fed Audit as
Party Mulls Platform Plank, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 20, 2012, 2:57 PM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-20/romney-calls-for-fed-audit-as-party-
mulls-platform-plank.html [https://perma.cc/4CVS-EYK3] (quoting then-presi-
dential candidate Mitt Romney saying he "would like to see the Fed audited").
12 See, e.g., Arthur W.S. Duff, Central Bank Independence and Macropruden-
tial Policy: A Critical Look at the U.S. Financial Stability Framework, 11 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 183, 212 (2014) (describing criticisms of the Fed's creation of a wholly
owned limited liability company designed to purchase distressed assets from Bear
Stearns); Emerson, supra note 11, at 129 ("[The Fed's attempt to conceal an
illegal purchase of AIG assets through the use of a wholly-controlled LLC is, at
best, a surreptitious attempt to circumvent the meaning of the Federal Reserve
Act and, at worst, an intentional and purposeful violation of the law."); Alexander
Mehra, Legal Authority in Unusual and Exigent Circumstances: The Federal Re-
serve and the Financial Crisis, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 221, 236 (2010) (arguing that
the creation of special purpose vehicles exceeded the Fed's authority under the
Federal Reserve Act). But see Gabilondo, supra note 9, at 783-85 (arguing that
the use of special purpose vehicles was legal); Porter, supra note 9, at 509 ("Sec-
tion 13(3) grants the Fed expansive authority in 'unusual and exigent circum-
stances,' without requiring a stringent legal standard be met in order to respond
to crises.") (footnote omitted).
13 See, e.g., PAUL, supra note 11, at 8-11 (characterizing Fed actions as the
"Ben Bernanke printing press" that created "trillions in new money out of thin air"
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interests of banks over the interests of less powerful firms and
individuals; 1 4 and it tends to over-emphasize its inflation-fight-
ing mandate over its employment-promoting mandate.15 Al-
though critics on the left and right disagree about exactly what
is wrong with the Fed's substantive priorities and performance,
they offer similar procedural critiques: the Fed, they complain,
is politically unaccountable and opaque.
Some of the foregoing criticisms are legitimate.' 6 Further-
more, if the Fed deserves praise for its response to the 2008
crisis and its aftermath, it must also share the blame for creat-
ing the crisis in the first place. Although it appropriately main-
tained low interest rates to sustain a weak economy during the
administration of George W. Bush, 1 7 it failed to provide the
without creating "any new wealth"); John P. Cochran, Fractional Reserve Banking
and Central Banking as Sources ofEconomic Instability: The Sound Money Alterna-
tive, 11 INDIAN J. ECON. & Bus. 543, 544-45 (2012) (arguing that "economic growth
driven by money ... creation is short term only; an artificial boom cannot last");
Chris Isidore, Gingrich- U.S. Should Reconsider the Gold Standard, CNN MONEY
(Jan. 18, 2012, 4:06 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/18/news/economy/
gingrich-gold-standard/index.htm [https://perma.cc/8EKX-N3K3] (promoting
the gold standard).
14 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Adminis-
trative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613,
1625 (2009) ("Critics argued ... that the bill favored the rich-the investment
banks, their managers, their shareholders-at the expense of the taxpayer, while
providing no relief to distressed homeowners . . . ."). But cf. David Wessel, Inside
Dr. Bernanke's E.R., WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2009, 12:13 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052970204271104574292094147841898 [https://
perma.cc/852W-RKC2] (quoting former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben
Bernanke saying, "I care about Wall Street for one reason and one reason only:
because what happens on Wall Street matters to Main Street.").
15 See MARc LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41656, CHANGING THE FEDERAL
RESERVE'S MANDATE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 9 (2013), http://fas.org:8080/sgp/crs/
misc/R41656.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ93-XUA9] [hereinafter LABONTE, CHANGING
THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S MANDATE]; Gabilondo, supra note 9, at 749-50; Daniel L.
Thornton, The Dual Mandate: Has the Fed Changed Its Objective?, 94 FED. RES.
BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 117, 117, 130 (2012), https://research.stlouisfed.org/
publications/review/ 12/03/117-134Thornton.pdf [https://perma.cc/94E7-
KY8L]; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Jan. 25, 2012),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120125c.htm
[https://perrna.cc/7YWR-KWUT (arguing that employment is driven primarily by
nonmonetary factors).
16 But some are not. In particular, the contention that the Fed creates money
out of thin air is an almost comically distorted description of how money comes
into existence. Indeed, if one understands what money is and the role of a central
bank, saying that money is created out of thin air is not a criticism but merely a
colorfully misleading metaphor. See infra Part I.
17 The Fed's low interest rate policy has been criticized from the political
right, as some observers claimed that low interest rates alone inexorably led to the
housing bubble. See, e.g., Lawrence H. White, Federal Reserve Policy and the
Housing Bubble, 29 CATO J. 115, 115-19 (2009) ("[Tlhe Federal Reserve's expan-
sionary monetary policy supplied the means for unsustainable housing prices
6
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necessary oversight of systemically important financial institu-
tions, which were especially in need of such oversight in a low-
interest rate environment.18
Nonetheless, even if some precisely targeted reforms of the
Fed can be justified based on the experience of the recent past,
calls to audit or end the Fed are quite misplaced.1 9 Although
and unsustainable mortgage financing."); John B. Taylor, How Government Cre-
ated the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.
com/articles/SB123414310280561945 [https://perma.cc/YU5S-3UBA] (arguing
that Fed actions led to and worsened the crisis). With appropriate oversight,
however, there is no reason to think that low interest rates-which were justified
as a macroeconomic policy matter-would have led to the mortgage crisis.
18 The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 15-16 (2008) (reporting
former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan's admission that he had put too much faith in
market forces); see also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 52-66 (2011), http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/VF2D-9N4R) (not-
ing the lack of effective regulation and the failure of federal officials to identify
systemic risk); Bryan J. Orticelli, Note, Crisis Compounded by Constraint: How
Regulatory Inadequacies Impaired the Fed's Bailout of Bear Stearns, 42 CONN. L.
REV. 647, 650-51 (2009) (arguing that fragmented regulatory authority contrib-
uted to the Fed's inability to anticipate systemic risk). As Professor Saule
Omarova observes, the very power to exempt financial institutions from Section
23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2006) (amended 2010), that
some critics claim the Fed abused in bailing out firms, played a key role in
creating the risky "shadow banking" regime in the lead-up to the crisis. See Saule
T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of
Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1702-29 (2011).
19 Campaigning as an economic populist (when not campaigning as a racist,
misogynist, and xenophobe), Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump
has repeated the calls by others in his party to "audit the Fed," but at least one
commentator opined "that Trump's heart isn't really in it." Jeff Spross, Donald
Trump is Shockingly Sane on the Federal Reserve, THE WEEK (Apr. 26, 2016),
http://theweek.com/articles/620637/donald-trump-shockingly-sane-federal-
reserve [https://perma.cc/PQ2Y-FV3M]. Given the hyperbolic and opportunistic
nature of Trump's policy pronouncements, we would not hazard a guess as to his
true druthers, if he even has any. We would note, however, that Trump's signa-
ture contribution to public debate about the government debt was the one idea
that may be more dangerous than subjecting the Fed to greater political control.
Specifically, Trump suggested pressuring holders of Treasury securities to accept
less than full payment, see Binyamin Appelbaum, Donald Trump's Idea to Cut
National Debt: Get Creditors to Accept Less, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/us/politics/donald-trumps-idea-to-cut-nation
al-debt-get-creditors-to-accept-less.html?_r=2 [https://perma.ce/UA3U-H2P7],
thus jeopardizing the credit rating of U.S. debt. Trump subsequently pretended
not to have meant what he obviously said, but the incoherence of his explanation,
see Neil H. Buchanan, The Trump Debt Repudiation Walk-Back Is Actually Funnier
Than His First Insane Idea, DORF ON LAw (May 10, 2016, 7:35 AM), http://
www.dorfonlaw.org/2016/05/the-trump-debt-repudiation-walk-back-is.html
[https://perma.cc/XD2A-JPS5], simply underscores that Trump has little under-
standing of economic policy.
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different in their details,2 0 at a minimum such proposals aim to
curtail Fed independence, thus subjecting monetary policy to
greater supervision by elected officials. 2 1
Subjecting the Fed to close political oversight would likely
have harmful, perhaps even disastrous, consequences. Any
country or, as in the case of the European Union, transnational
political unit, that maintains its own currency, needs a central
bank that is independent of close political oversight in order to
ensure that politicians do not manipulate the monetary system
for short-term political gain at the risk of inflicting long-term
economic damage. The classic worry is that incumbents will
provide excessive economic stimulus in the months leading up
to an election, even when the best economic analysis would call
for tightening the spigot.2 2 Accordingly, although the Fed is a
20 Several bills have been proposed over the years calling for the Fed to be
audited. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2015, S. 264, 114th Cong.
(2015) (calling for "a full audit of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System and the Federal reserve banks by the Comptroller General of the United
States"); Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2015, H.R. 24, 114th Cong. (2015)
(same); Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2014, H.R. 24, 113th Cong. (2014)
(same); Federal Reserve Transparency Act of 2013, S. 209, 113th Cong. (2013)
(same); see alsoAudit the Fed Act of 2013, H.R. 33, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposing
reform of the manner in which the Comptroller General audits the Board of
Governors); Bernie Sanders, To Rein in Wall Street, Fix the Fed, N.Y. TIES (Dec.
23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/23/opinion/bernie-sanders-to-
rein-in-wall-street-fix-the-fed.html?r=0 [https://perma.ce/NE3C-YFM7] ("We
need to . . . require the Government Accountability Office to conduct a full and
independent audit of the Fed each and every year.").
21 We use the term "independence" to connote the fact that the Fed does not
answer directly to the president or to Congress, but not to suggest that, as cur-
rently structured, outside actors, including political actors, have no influence on
the Fed. If meant to imply economic expertise divorced from other constraints, we
agree with Peter Conti-Brown's assessment that "'independence' . . . is a concept
without much analytical content." PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPEN-
DENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE xit (2016). The very complexity of the Fed's struc-
ture belies the image of the Fed as a single expert actor. See id. at 8 ("[The Fed is
one of the most organizationally complex entities in the federal government ... [,]
a 'they,' not an'itl ' ..... "). We nonetheless find the term "independence" useful as
a shorthand for the degree of autonomy from elected officials that the Federal
Reserve system enjoys relative to typical federal agencies within the executive
branch.
22 Even as he deconstructs the concept of Fed independence, Conti-Brown
aptly summarizes the standard justification for it:
Fed independence is the separation, by statute, of the central bank-
ers (specifically the Fed Chair) and the politicians (specifically the
president) for purposes of maintaining low inflation.... [Clitizens in
a democracy naturally prefer a prosperous economy. Politicians
please us by giving us that prosperity, or at least trying to take
credit for it. But when there is no prosperity to be had, politicians
will resort to goosing the economy artificially by running the print-
ing presses to provide enough money and credit for all. The short-
term result is reelection for the politicians. The long-term result is
8
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creation of Congress rather than the Constitution itself, its
independence can be justified with structural arguments sinii-
lar to those typically offered to justify the independence of the
Article III judiciary. Just as we cannot fully trust majoritarian
politics to safeguard the constitutional rights of minorities, so
we cannot trust venal politicians who have incentives timed to
the political cycle to set monetary policy timed to the business
cycle, all the while keeping in mind longer-term goals of growth
and stability.
Ironically, however, in the current climate the harmful con-
sequences of ending or auditing the Fed would not flow from
the profligacy of politicians but from their foolish commitment
to austerity. We need the Fed to be independent now in large
part because subjecting it to close scrutiny by politically ac-
countable actors would likely lead to unduly tight monetary
policy. The Fed could no longer use monetary policy to
counteract the baleful effects of ideologically driven tight fiscal
policy. It would become part of the problem rather than part of
the solution. Thus, even if the standard justification of the
Fed's independence envisions the Fed tilting against too-loose
monetary preferences among politicians, from an economic
perspective, that justification applies equally when politician's
preferences point in the opposite direction. Either way, the Fed
serves as an important counterweight to politically motivated
excess.
Is this reversal of the standard justification for central
bank independence merely ironic, or does it raise a deeper
problem of democratic accountability? So long as we can point
to structural reasons for Fed independence, we have an answer
to whatever "counter-majoritarian difficulty" such indepen-
dence raises. 23 But if our best justification for Fed indepen-
dence is that politicians frequently make bad economic
decisions, then the argument for Fed independence has no
logical stopping point. Politicians make bad decisions in many
areas. They under-invest in infrastructure; they deny climate
change; they subsidize industries that harm human health;
they enact criminal laws that destroy the lives of nonviolent
offenders and their families; and so forth. If the risk of merely
worthless money that wreaks havoc on our economic, social, and
political institutions.
Id. at 2.
23 Alexander Bickel coined the term "counter-majoritarian difficulty" to de-
scribe the uneasy place of judicial review in a basically democratic system. ALEX-
ANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962). We use it here to
associate Fed independence with judicial independence.
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sub-optimal policies emerging from the political process justi-
fies lodging power in expert agencies subject to little or no
political oversight, then there will be very little room for govern-
ance by elected officials.
Can Fed independence be justified on grounds that do not
also justify technocracy across the board? This Article argues
that it can be.
Even though we currently live in an age in which surpris-
ingly large numbers of policy makers are committed to eco-
nomic austerity, the classic worry that political actors, if given
the chance, will loosen credit when they ought to tighten it is
real and could recur. Just as Vincent Blasi has argued that
one ought to take a "pathological perspective" by designing
constitutional rules governing free speech to protect against
the worst of times, even if we usually live in good times, 2 4 So too
here, our government institutions regarding the economy
should be constructed for the long run. And in the long run,
political actors have incentives to manipulate monetary pol-
icy-and to try to intimidate the Fed in an attempt to change
regulatory outcomes-to their advantage. Therefore, even if
one disagrees with our economic analysis, and approves of
austerity, the Fed's independence should be protected.
Our point is not simply that political actors will slight the
long-term health of the economy for short-term gains. After all,
political actors have incentives to focus on the short run with
respect to many policy areas. Under-investment in infrastruc-
ture results in part from the fact that the benefits of infrastruc-
ture projects are spread out over many years or even decades.2 5
Likewise, addressing environmental problems may require cur-
rent sacrifices to benefit future generations. 2 6 If the short-
sightedness of politicians were the only justification for Fed
independence, then the argument really would amount to ad-
vocacy for technocracy tout court.
24 Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85
coLUM. L. REv. 449, 449-50 (1985).
25 Infrastructure projects produce immediate benefits in the form of con-
struction and ancillary jobs, but political considerations often distort the distribu-
tion of these benefits. For example, the government may pour money into
building a new bridge in a powerful House member's district while neglecting
needed rail improvements across many districts of less influential members.
Moreover, the short-term benefits of infrastructure projects that are cost-justified
in the long term may be smaller than the short-term benefits to current constitu-
ents of tax cuts or transfer payments.
26 See generally Neil H. Buchanan, What Kind of Environment Do We Owe
Future Generations?, 15 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 339, 361-67 (2011).
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But political control of a central bank does not merely cre-
ate a risk of shortsighted policy. It creates a risk of political
self-dealing of the same sort that, in other contexts, is thought
to justify departures from majoritarianism in the name of con-
stitutional democracy. We have already mentioned the inde-
pendent judiciary as guarantor of minority rights as a
constitutionally enshrined example of this sort of institutional
design. There are also subconstitutional examples, such as the
use of special prosecutors to investigate and prosecute high-
ranking executive officials and the use of politically-indepen-
dent election commissions or ostensibly neutral courts to su-
pervise the election process. Although these kinds of
institutions have been implemented imperfectly in the United
States, they rest on some of the same basic logic that justifies
an independent Fed: incumbent elected officials ought not to
be permitted to use the tools of government to gain unfair ad-
vantage in political contests. As John Hart Ely famously put
the point in defending representation-reinforcing judicial re-
view, counter-majoritarianism is easiest to justify when it
serves to prevent the "ins" from exploiting their position to stay
"in."27
In addition, the sheer scale of the problems that a central
bank must confront-encompassing the entire economy and
posing risks of catastrophe such as hyperinflation or depres-
sion-and the speed with which it must act in the face of an
emergency, call for an institution that can respond with alac-
rity. It might be thought that, following the logic of Federalist
No. 70, the "Energy in the Executive" permits the president to
oversee a central bank that can respond to financial crises
rapidly and effectively.28 But because of the need to calm mar-
kets in troubled times, the Fed's policymaking board-indeed
the Federal Reserve System as a whole-has sensibly been
given policy independence, with political accountability ulti-
mately deriving from the appointment and removal processes
for Fed governors and regional bank presidents as well as Con-
gress's power (which it has thus far wisely chosen not to exer-
cise) to change the statutory mandate of the Fed (indeed, to
dismantle the Fed entirely) at any time, subject to the reactions
of the public and the financial markets to any meddling with
the Fed's historical mandate and powers. 29 Indeed, as we ex-
27 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 10 1-04 (1980).
28 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that an energetic,
unitary executive promotes political accountability and sound management).
29 See supra note 1.
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plain at greater length below, in general and in times of crisis,
the Fed's status as an entity that is not really a part of any of
the three branches of government enables it to act as an inde-
pendent counterparty to transactions with the more directly
presidentially accountable (and thus politically manipulable)
Treasury Department.
Although it is possible to imagine some of the current regu-
latory responsibilities of the Fed being reallocated to more di-
rectly accountable government agencies, independence
contributes substantially to its ability to perform its key func-
tion as a central bank. As we argue in Part I, moreover, the
interactions between the Fed's regulatory responsibilities and
its mandate to conduct monetary policy writ large make sense
of the Fed's current, broad portfolio.
This Article examines and responds to critiques of Fed in-
dependence in four parts. Part I presents a brief schematic
overview of the structure and powers of the Fed. Part II cata-
logues the main criticisms of the Fed, distinguishing those
that, if valid, could be addressed by modest statutory changes,
from those that fundamentally challenge Fed independence.
Part III explains how the Fed used its powers during the 2008
financial crisis and its aftermath to stabilize the economy, and
how it might play an essential role in rescuing the economy in
the event that the United States finds itself unable to pay its
bills due to debt ceiling brinksmanship. Part IV then elabo-
rates on the argument for Fed independence even in an era of
austerity, explaining how an independent central bank fits in
the overall constitutional design. We conclude by identifying a
connection between contemporary anxiety about Fed indepen-
dence and a longstanding but deeply problematic strain of Jef-
fersonian and Jacksonian populism dating to the earliest days
of the American Republic.
I
AN INDEPENDENT CENTRAL BANK: THE STRUCTURE AND
POWERS OF THE FED
The Federal Reserve System is the central bank of the
United States. Like the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan,
and the European Central Bank (as well as the national central
banks that the latter institution replaced, including the
Bundesbank and the Banque de France), the Fed was created
to control the levers of monetary policy, most importantly in-
cluding setting interest rates (and thus controlling the supply
[Vol. 102:112
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of money).3 0 In turn, these responsibilities for carrying out
monetary policy at the macroeconomic level require that it have
significant regulatory powers over the banking system.
The roots of the Fed date back to the earliest years of the
Republic. The First Bank of the United States-the earliest
predecessor to the Fed-served a number of vital functions, but
it was not a central bank in the modern sense.3 1 In any event,
its charter expired in 1811, leaving the United States without a
nationally chartered bank until 1816, when the Second Bank
of the United States was created. 32 In the intervening period,
the United States nearly lost the War of 1812, partly because
its efforts were severely hampered by the lack of enthusiasm of
state-chartered private banks for providing credit to the federal
government.3 3 Consequently, following the war, President
James Madison, whose Jeffersonian Republican Party had pre-
viously opposed the Bank, signed into law the bill creating the
Second Bank of the United States.3 4 A few years later, Chief
Justice John Marshall pithily alluded to this history in McCul-
loch v. Maryland, when he wrote that "a short experience of the
embarrassments to which the refusal to revive [the First Bank]
exposed the government, convinced those who were most
prejudiced against the measure of its necessity, and induced
the passage of the" law chartering the Second Bank.35
Nonetheless, President Andrew Jackson vetoed legislation
that would have renewed the Second Bank's charter, offering
populist and xenophobic reasons.3 6 In the nearly eight de-
cades between the cessation of operations of the Second Bank
and the establishment of the Federal Reserve, the federal gov-
ernment continued to develop a system to regulate banks. For
example, during and after the Civil War, Congress passed a
30 See KEVIN D. HOOVER, APPLIED INTERMEDIATE MACROECONOMICs 624-25
(2012).
31 See generally ROGER T. JOHNSON, HISTORICAL BEGINNINGS . . . THE FEDERAL
RESERVE 7-8 (Mary Jane Coyle & Suzanne Cummings eds., 2010) (noting the basic
and limited functions of the First Bank).
32 See RALPH C.H. CATERALL, THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (1903).
33 See id. ("The Second Bank of the United States owed its origin to the
disasters of the war of 1812 . . . .").
34 See id. at 21 (noting that Madison signed the bill after vetoing a similar one
the previous year).
35 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (1819).
36 President Andrew Jackson, Veto Message Regarding the Bank of the United




series of banking statutes,3 7 which were most directly aimed at
allowing the federal government to borrow money to finance the
war effort, but which also established a national currency, cre-
ated a national banking system, set up a system to regulate
commercial banks, and enacted other important regulatory
and policy innovations.38 At the same time, however, the lack
of a federal central bank left the states to regulate banking in
parallel with the much weaker federal regulatory system. The
monetary system changed and largely improved over time, but
the progress was halting and sporadic.
The history of this period is, not coincidentally, littered
with periodic financial crises (then called "panics"), which bled
over from Wall Street to Main Street and became severe eco-
nomic depressions. Among the worst of these were the Panic of
1873 and the Panic of 1907,3@ the latter of which finally moved
Congress to create a central bank for the United States,40
which came into being in 1913.
Even though the political climate in 1913 finally allowed
the creation of a central bank for the United States, Jacksonian
distrust of centralized financial power remained a potent force.
In particular, the popular appeal of political figures such as
William Jennings Bryan was based in large part on the public's
fear of Wall Street and worries about the power of banks over
people's lives. As a result, the country's new central bank was
not called 'The Bank of the United States," or "The Central
Bank of America." Instead, President Wilson chose the ano-
dyne name "Federal Reserve System." That political sensitivity
carried over from the naming of the central bank to the creation
of a rather byzantine structure.
37 The National Banking Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864); The National Bank-
ing Act, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863). See also Act of July 13, 1866, 14 Stat. 98,
146-47.
38 The brief historical summary in this paragraph and the next two are com-
mon knowledge. For a good introduction, see generally JOHNSON, supra note 31.
39 See 1873: Off the Rails, HARV. Bus. SCH. (2012) http://www.library.
hbs.edu/hc/crises/ 1873.html [https://perma.cc/SAE5-D99K]; 1907: The Bank-
ers' Panic, HARv. Bus. SCH. (2012) http://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/crises/
1907.html [https://perma.cc/YC38-VJ3E].
40 See Jon R. Moen & Ellis W. Tallman, The Panic of 1907, FED. RES. HisT.
(Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/Detailview/97
[https://perma.cc/DE69-M9BK] (noting that the Panic of 1907 spurred the mon-
etary reform movement that led to the establishment of the Federal Reserve
System).
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A. Structure of the Fed
Given the fear of centralizing financial power in New York
or Washington, the new Federal Reserve System was created to
give the appearance of a nationwide structure, based on what
looks like a confederation of twelve regional Federal Reserve
banks.4 1 Although they would be part of the federal govern-
ment, these regional banks were located in important cities
across the country, generally reflecting regional population
patterns in 1913.42
However, had those regional banks been an important part
of the policymaking apparatus (or, for that matter, if they had
even been helpful in connecting local economies with the cen-
tral bank), one would have expected to see the creation of more
regional federal reserve banks as the economic and demo-
graphic centers of gravity in the United States moved west-
ward. Instead, more than a century after its creation, the same
twelve Federal Reserve Banks continue to operate, and no new
banks have come into existence. It is particularly notable that
the only Federal Reserve regional bank in the western half of
the United States is in San Francisco, even as regional banks
continue to operate in, for example, Richmond, Cleveland, and
Kansas City. 4 3
The only policymaking power bestowed on regional banks
is through their presidents' service as voting members of the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).44 The voting mem-
bership of that committee always includes five presidents of the
regional banks, four of whom serve on a one-year rotating ba-
sis, with the president of the New York Fed always sitting as a
voting member. By contrast, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System consists of seven presidential appoin-
41 The regional banks are located in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Cleve-
land, Richmond, Atlanta, Chicago, St. Louis, Minneapolis, Kansas City, Dallas,
and San Francisco. The Twelve Federal Reserve Districts, THE FED. RESERVE BD.
(Dec. 13, 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/otherfrb.htm [https://perma.cc/
6D7F-XJBJ].
42 HOOVER, supra note 30, at 625.
43 The regional banks have opened some "branch" banks in major cities such
as Miami (a branch of Atlanta's regional Fed) and Los Angeles (a branch of San
Francisco's), but those operations are entirely devoted to most mundane tasks.
See The Atlanta Fed, FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA, https://www.frbatlanta.org/
about/atlantafed.aspx [https://perma.cc/BQY8-WAKV]; Our History, FED. RES.
BANK OF S.F. (2016), http://www.frbsf.org/our-district/about/our-history/
[https://perma.cc/3CKN-4TLR. Certainly, no policy decisions are made even at
the regional bank level, much less at the branch level.
44 See G. THOMAS WOODWARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., No. 96-672 E, MONEY AND




tees, each having a vote on the FOMC and each serving a four-
teen-year term.4 5 The President appoints one of those
governors as the chairperson of the Fed, for a four-year renew-
able term, subject to confirmation by the Senate.46
The real policymaking power in the Federal Reserve, then,
resides in the Board of Governors, which is located in Washing-
ton. Although the regional presidents vote on the FOMC, they
are, by design, outnumbered by the presidentially appointed
governors of the system. Effectively, therefore, the Fed is run
as a central bank, from the nation's capital.
B. Powers of the Fed
Even as the United States was hampered by frequent pan-
ics in the pre-Fed period, the country was emerging as a global
economic power. Accordingly, the Fed's designers sought to
construct an institution with powers commensurate to the na-
tion's role in the global economy.4 7 They bestowed upon it
powers that would allow the Fed to intervene when necessary
to prevent the financial system from spinning out of control.
Financial stability is its central concern.
The Fed is commonly referred to as the "lender of last re-
sort" to signify that the Fed will lend money to key financial
players when private sector actors cannot or will not do so, and
when the financial system cannot otherwise withstand the dis-
ruption that would come from the collapse of a systemically
important institution.4 8 The financial system occasionally
comes under severe pressure and is in danger of collapse be-
cause banks or other financial institutions unexpectedly find
themselves short of funds needed to continue operating. For
example, if a large bank were to announce an unexpected loss
or other worrying news, other banks (in what is known as a
"contagion effect") could find that their depositors withdraw
more funds from their accounts than they would otherwise
wish to withdraw, simply as a matter of caution. This can then
create a series of "runs" on banks, all of which need more
money on hand than usual to prevent default. None of those
institutions would necessarily have engaged in any unwise be-
havior that would have precipitated the crisis, but all are in
45 Board Members, BD. GOvERNoRS FED. REs. Sys., http://www.federalreserve.
gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/default.htm [https://perma.cc/8Y2B-WGQL] (last
updated Sept. 12, 2014).
46 12 U.S.C. § 241 (2014).
47 See generally JOHNSON, supra note 31, at 22-32 (describing the political
development of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913).
48 CONTI-BROWN, supra note 21, at 151-53.
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danger of collapse because of the interconnected nature of the
financial system.
Any such situation poses risks for the real economy as
well, because even the most basic operations of a modem busi-
ness rely on the availability of ready credit. Businesses typi-
cally pay their suppliers and employees on a predictable (and
legally enforceable) schedule, rather than having to wait until
their accounts receivable actually become cash in hand be-
cause those businesses have relationships with banks that
smooth out cash flows. Moreover, when banks begin to pull
back on loans that would have financed other businesses' ex-
pansions, or when fewer home mortgages are offered, and so
on, the effects cascade onto those whose transactions are con-
tingent on the original loan being completed. (For example, the
sellers of House A cannot buy their dream home, House B,
unless the buyer of House A receives the loan necessary to
close the deal. If that deal falls through, the seller of House B is
similarly unable to proceed with her plans to buy House C, and
so on.)
These risks are inherent in any financial system because
every creditor-debtor relationship is predicated on the ability of
the rest of the financial system to provide flows of funds to
enable business to be transacted. Therefore, the lender-of-last-
resort role of the Federal Reserve is fundamental to its effective-
ness as the primary regulator of the U.S. financial system.4 9
Giving the Fed the power to lend money wherever and
whenever needed to prevent a crisis, however, necessarily
raises two related questions. First, where does the Fed get the
money necessary to inject into the financial system when it is
needed? And second, if the Fed can put new money into the
system at will, might the Fed not run the risk of creating too
49 Notably, the European Central Bank (ECB), which began operating in 1999
in conjunction with the euro, was not formally given the power to act as the lender
of last resort for its member countries and banks. European financial crises over
the last several years ultimately led the ECB's chairman to declare in 2012 that
his institution would do "whatever it takes" to bring stability to the Eurozone's
financial system. This announcement that the ECB was taking on the lender-of-
last-resort role calmed the markets almost immediately. Although many
problems remain in Europe, the ECB's decision to act more like the Fed was a
major step forward. See generally Gerhard Iling and Phillip K6nig, The European
Central Bank as Lender of Last Resort, DIW ECON. BULL., Nov. 2014, at 16, 27-29
https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diwO1.c.488640.de/
diweconbull_2014-09-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/B77R-CFET] (describing the
possible role of the ECB in future financial crises).
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much money, thus raising the possibility that it would inadver-
tently set off an inflationary spiral?5 o
The answer to the first question-where does the money
come from?-is counterintuitive but ultimately unavoidable in
any economy that is not simply a barter system. Every govern-
ment, whether or not it nominally ties its currency to a com-
modity such as gold or silver, and whether or not it creates a
central bank, ultimately has the power to create money where
money did not exist before. Certainly, every central bank must
have that power in order to fulfill its central role as lender of
last resort, or else it too would be powerless to break out of the
market contagions and other threats that arise in the financial
system. When everyone else is pulling back, the central bank
must be able to extend itself and do what others cannot or will
not do.
As a technical matter, the Fed can create money simply by
buying assets from private and government actors, with those
actors accepting a check from the Fed. Why does the
counterparty accept a check from the Fed? Because it is a
check from the Fed, and the Fed is the guarantor of money.
Money is, ultimately, an exercise in group psychology.5 1 The
Fed thus creates money by "injecting" newly created funds into
the financial system, in so doing accumulating assets on its
balance sheet, which are matched on the liability side by the
Fed's legal requirement to stand behind its money, that is, the
dollars that it has created. 52
The second question noted above-if the Fed can create
money at will, how can we guarantee that it will not create too
much money?-raises the key issue underlying all of modern
monetary policy. The answer, however, is generally provided
not by having the Fed concern itself directly with the number of
dollars that it has created (although it certainly keeps close
50 Although it is beyond the scope of this article, we note here that there is no
direct connection between the creation of money and inflation, much less between
money growth and hyperinflation. See Paul Krugman, Opinion, Way Off Base,
N.Y. TIMES: THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (Oct. 7, 2011, 3:15 PM), http://krug-
man.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/07/way-off-base-2/?_r=O [https://perma.cc/
9DC7-82E8).
51 See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, Money Is Magic, DORF ON LAw (Feb. 7, 2013,
10:15 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2013/02/money-is-magic.html [https://
perma.cc/6QTF-LLH8).
52 If someone presents a dollar-a "Federal Reserve Note"-for payment, the
Fed is obligated to pay that person in dollars. That is, the obligation to "honor its
debts" is simply a requirement that the Fed pay dollars for dollars. It is thus easy
to understand why confusion and cynicism about the role of central banks per-
sists. Even though the system can be inherently stable, it is easy to describe it as
a shell game.
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track of all such "monetary aggregates"), but with the indirect
effect that its asset purchases have on interest rates. That is,
when the Fed buys (and sometimes sells) government bonds, it
can make the prices of those bonds go up or down. Because
the interest rates on bonds are inversely related to the bonds'
prices, the Fed can directly target interest rates for government
bonds.53 For example, if the Fed believes that the interest rate
is too low, it can sell bonds, pushing down the price of those
bonds and thus pushing up their interest rate.54
Although the Fed can also adjust other levers of monetary
policy (changing the interest rate on loans that it makes di-
rectly to commercial banks,5 5 as well as changing the rules
that allow commercial banks to turn deposits into loans),56 the
Fed carries out its monetary policy role almost exclusively
through its purchases and sales of government bonds through
"open market operations." Those operations allow the Fed to
control interest rates, and (as noted above) concomitantly de-
termine how much money the Fed creates.
Together, these mechanisms enable the Fed to create as
much money as is necessary to keep the economy healthy, and
no more. The Federal Reserve Act requires the Fed to engage in
policies to promote "stable prices," which means that if the Fed
needs to create money to avert a crisis (through its key role as
lender of last resort), it must continually ensure that its pre-
and post-crisis actions recalibrate the setting of interest rates
and the creation of money to keep the economy from overheat-
ing and thus igniting inflation.5 7
Importantly, however, the Federal Reserve Act requires the
Fed (acting through the FOMC) to do more than guard against
the possibility that inflation will get out of control. The Fed
must "promote effectively the goals of maximum employment,
53 See WILLAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, MACROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND
PoLIcY 249-87 (10th ed. 2006).
54 Although we refer to "the interest rate" as if there were only one such rate,
there are many rates, including credit card rates, mortgage rates, corporate bond
rates, state and local bond rates, and federal Treasury bond rates. The interest
rate that the Fed directly targets is called the Fed Funds Rate, which is the rate on
overnight loans between banks. This rate is not directly important for consumer
and business transactions, but other rates tend to rise or fall in concert with the
Fed Funds Rate. In Part II, we discuss Quantitative Easing, a program in which
the Fed sought to move the interest rates on longer-term securities.
55 This is called the discount rate. See BAUMOL & BLINDER, supra note 53, at
258.
56 The Fed has the power to set "reserve requirements," which determine how
much money banks must keep "on reserve" to meet daily cash requirements,
rather than lending the money for profit. Id.
57 See 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2014).
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stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates."58 That
is, in addition to worrying about inflation (which, again, means
worrying about interest rates), the Fed must also attempt to
balance concerns about inflation with concerns about unem-
ployment. One sure way to keep prices low, after all, would be
to push up interest rates, but that would lead to increases in
unemployment. By law, however, the Fed must strike a rea-
sonable balance between inflation and unemployment.
What constitutes such a reasonable balance? Congress
spoke to this issue with the Full Employment and Balanced
Growth Act of 1978,59 in which it specified that the president
should aim for zero percent inflation and three percent unem-
ployment from 1988 onward.6 o Congress further instructed
the Fed to coordinate its monetary policy with the president's
policy, thus at least committing the Fed to those goals at one
step of remove. In practice, however, those goals have never
been met. The unemployment rate briefly dipped below four
percent during 2000, but it has never reached three percent,
and it has averaged above five percent even in norn-recession-
ary years. 6 1 Similarly, the inflation rate has been generally
positive (though still quite low) throughout this period. Per-
haps more importantly, the Fed several years ago announced a
policy goal of two percent inflation-not as a maximum, but as
a specific target-based on economic research suggesting that
there are needlessly high costs to trying to achieve zero infla-
tion, and that a stable positive inflation target would afford the
Fed greater latitude in responding to crises. 62
58 j4j
59 Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, Pub L. No. 95-523, 92
Stat. 1887 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3101-52 (2014)) (also called the
Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act).
60 Rich Karlgaard, The 10%-10k Conundrum, FORBES (Nov. 12, 2009, 5:22
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/digitalrules/2009/11/12/the-10-10k-conun
drum/ [https://perma.cc/YF79-3A8S].
61 See Unemployment Rate in the United States from 1990 to 2015, STATISTA,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/193290/unemployment-rate-in-the-usa-
since- 1990/ [https://perma.cc/NJW7-WS7Y]. The annual unemployment rate in
2000 was four percent, but for five months of that year it was slightly below that
figure. See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. DEP'T
LABOR, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 [https://perma.cc/Q4Q2-
VGNY] (set parameters to "2000" to see monthly data).
62 R.A., Why the Fed Targets 2% Inflation Rate, ECONOMIST: THE EcONOMIST
ExPLAINs (Sept. 13, 2015, 11:31 AM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/econo
mist-explains/2015/09/economist-explains-7 [https://perma.cc/YRK3-Z9LTI.
Recently, the "real" interest rate has been negative. But because the real rate is
the difference between nominal interest rates and the inflation rate, a higher rate
of inflation would have allowed the Fed to reduce real interest rates even more
than it was able to in a lower-inflation environment. See infra note 110.
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Even though the specific targets in the 1978 law have not
been achieved (and might not even be achievable), the Fed is
still required to engage in a balancing act, applying its dele-
gated power to set interest rates and to regulate the financial
system to minimize both inflation and unemployment.63 Dis-
agreements about the relative weights that the Fed has put on
unemployment versus inflation have fueled some of the criti-
cisms of the Fed that we describe in Part II below.
Indeed, some critics of the Fed believe that it should have
no policy discretion at all, and that the Fed should instead
become nothing more than the employer of a group of techni-
cians who enact a mechanical monetary rule that is set in law
by Congress. We next explain why the Fed should not only
continue to be given the latitude to adjust policy by applying its
reasoned judgment, but that such judgment will be best exer-
cised in an environment where the Fed is largely protected from
direct influence by political actors.
C. Why Is the Fed Independent, and What Does That
Entail?
As we explained in the preceding subpart, the Fed's raison
d'tre (based on what might be thought of as its "origin story" in
the aftermath of the series of financial panics in the 19th and
early 20th centuries) creates a series of related imperatives in
the Fed's structure and policy goals. Because the Fed must be
able to prevent financial crises, it must be able to provide "li-
quidity"-that is, to create new money-when the various ac-
tors in the financial system simultaneously engage in self-
protecting (and individually rational) actions that could create
catastrophic cascading effects. But if the Fed is to be the
lender of last resort, it must be mindful that its emergency
lending activities can have effects on the money supply and
perforce on interest rates. Thus, in order to do its primary
job-to prevent financial and economic crises-the Fed must
either coordinate with some other (already-extant or hypotheti-
cal) agency that is setting money supply and interest rates on a
non-emergency basis, or the Fed itself must be given the power
to control the money supply and interest rates in both good
63 Even though the Federal Reserve Act specifies "price stability" as a goal of
the Fed, see What Are the Federal Reserve's Objectives in Conducting Monetary
Policy?, BD. GOVERNORS FED. REs. Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/mo
ney_12848.htm [https://perma.cc/4C67-QXB9] (last updated June 15, 2016),
that does not necessarily require the inflation rate to be zero. Prices can rise at a
predictable rate and be "stable" in a meaningful sense.
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times and bad. As a practical matter, even if those roles were
separated, the two agencies would need to act effectively as one
in order to follow their respective and related policy mandates.
And once Congress has given the Fed control over monetary
policy in general, it makes sense that the Fed should be re-
quired to consider the effects of its policy choices not just on
inflation but on unemployment, growth, and other economic
policy goals as well.
Having said all of that, however, there is nothing in our
account to this point that would require a central bank to be
politically independent. That is, the power to create and con-
trol the monetary system, which in the United States is an
enumerated power of Congress,6 4 could be directly carried out
by Congress itself, as part of its ongoing legislative agenda.
Just as Congress has not created a politically insulated board
to control fiscal policy (taxing and spending),6 5 it could decide
that it wants to take regular votes on monetary policy issues,
setting interest rates directly or indirectly by majority votes in
both houses of Congress (subject to the usual Article I, Section
7 rules of presidential vetoes and overrides). Although mem-
bers of Congress generally possess no expertise in monetary
policy, our system of governance does not require expertise,
but only democratic representation.
Congress has wisely concluded, however, that its lack of
expertise in monetary policy is good reason to delegate its au-
thority to an expert body. Even so, the various duties that the
Fed currently carries out, especially the highly essential func-
tion of setting interest rates that we described in subpart I.B
above, could in principle be delegated to the executive branch.
The Treasury Department already bears responsibility for cre-
ating physical coins and currency,66 and it also carries out
various delegated functions of fiscal policy, including borrow-
ing funds to finance federal budget deficits (as we discuss in
Part III below). Congress could thus further delegate to Trea-
sury or some other executive branch agency the authority not
only to implement aspects of monetary policy but to formulate
it as well, so long as Congress complied with the minimal re-
64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("Congress shall have ... [the] Power ... [t]o coin
money [and] regulate the [vialue thereof. . . .").
65 But see Buchanan, Good Deficits, supra note 7, at 126-27 (proposing that
Congress create a "fiscal Fed").
66 See Coins and Currency, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/
services/Pages/coins-currency.aspx [https://perma.cc/773R-UR7K].
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quirement of articulating some "intelligible principle" to guide
the agency.67
Running monetary policy through either of the political
branches, however, would leave open the possibility that the
vicissitudes of electoral politics could lead to monetary policy
decisions that are keyed to short-term political gains, leading
to short-term economic volatility and threatening to undermine
longer-term stability and growth. Indeed, the classic argument
in favor of a politically insulated monetary authority, as noted
in the Introduction, has always been based on the concern that
political actors would tend to create too much money, thus
risking ever-rising inflation. History is littered with examples
of exactly this kind of catastrophe.68
As we describe in Parts III and IV, however, this is not the
only possible reason to set up the monetary authority as a
politically independent agency. Especially in the current politi-
cal environment, it turns out that the Fed can act as an appro-
priate counterbalance against political winds that would slow
the economy down.
In any event, the current structure of the Fed creates the
kind of policy independence that we think is now more impor-
tant than ever. Although we recognize that independence is a
matter of multidimensional degree rather than a simple on/off
proposition,6 9 we think it clear that along the most relevant.
dimensions, the Fed counts as relatively independent, rather
than relatively accountable to the president or to Congress.
The terms of the Fed's governors are long (fourteen years) and
staggered, so that no single president is likely to be able to
67 E.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting
J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). Such an
intelligible principle could look exactly like the current Federal Reserve Act's
requirement to strive for maximum employment, price stability, and moderate
interest rates. "Intelligible" need not mean "specific."
68 The Revolutionary War era spawned the term "not worth a Continental" to
refer to worthless currency, reflecting the creation of large amounts of money by
the Continental Congress. See The Revolutionary War to the War of 1812, TAX
ANALYSTS, http://www.taxhistory.org/www/website.nsf/Web/THM1777?Open
Document [https://perma.cc/G47M-X3QA. Interwar Germany also famously ex-
perienced hyperinflation (and a serious depression) that led to catastrophic politi-
cal and human consequences. See Mamta Badkar, 10 Hyperinflation Horror
Stories of the 20th Century, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 19, 2011, 10:09 AM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/10-hyperinflation-stories-of-the-20th-century-2011-
3?op=1 [https://perma.cc/K7ML-M4ZG. In the 1980s, Argentina experienced
extreme hyperinflation that rose to 12,000% in 1989. See id.
69 See infra text accompanying notes 172-182.
2016]1 23
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
reshape the Fed's policy preferences on a wholesale basis. 70
And even if the president could do so, he would not be able to
demand the resignations of Fed governors who subsequently
act contrary to the president's immediate preferences.
Similarly, the other voting members of the FOMC are presi-
dents of the regional Federal Reserve Banks. The selection
process for regional bank presidents involves even less direct
input from the political branches.7 1 Although we agree with
critics who suggest that the regional presidents should also be
presidentially appointed (and, like the Fed's governors, subject
to confirmation by the Senate), 7 2 the FOMC under either sys-
tem possesses the ability to act independently. Voting in an
unpopular way cannot result in firing or censure.
Even so, the Fed can still fairly be described as accountable
in an important sense. All of the voting members have under-
gone rigorous public vetting, and all of them have reason to be
judicious in making policy choices because they are under in-
tense scrutiny at all times. Moreover, everyone knows that the
Federal Reserve exists by act of Congress, and that Congress
could at any time change the degree of independence under
which the Fed operates, including shutting it down entirely.
Reining in the Fed in that way is rightly controversial, and it is
understood that efforts to make even modest changes to the
Fed (or to the rules governing monetary policy more generally)
should be undertaken with great care because of the possible
effects of such momentous changes on financial markets and
the broader economy. Indeed, we argue throughout this Article
that the Fed ought not be made substantially more accounta-
ble than it currently is. Even so, the Fed is always on notice
that it is not truly free to act only on its own judgment. By
contrast with members of the federal judiciary, whose life ten-
ure and salary protection could not be eliminated except by a
70 The possibility of early resignations can create simultaneous appointment
opportunities for a president. Even so, a president's ability to change monetary
policy through the appointments process is by design much more limited than his
ability to control policy made through more directly accountable agencies. See
Who Are the Members of the Federal Reserve Board, and How Are They Selected?,
BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES., https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_125
91.htm [https://perma.cc/5GZ5-YQUC] (last updated July 22, 2015).
71 See How Is a Federal Reserve Bank President Selected?, BD. GOVERNORS
FED. REs., https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/how-is-a-federal-reserve-bank-
president-selected.htm [https://perma.cc/4P4G-WYK7] (last updated Jan. 25,
2016).
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constitutional amendment, the Fed's independence could be
modified or revoked by ordinary legislation.
In addition, Congress has required that the Fed's chair
testify regularly before the relevant committees of the House
and Senate, which gives the Fed and Congress the opportunity
to engage in (sometimes highly contentious) public exchanges
about policy goals.
In these very important senses, therefore, the Fed is politi-
cally accountable but policy independent.73 This policy inde-
pendence, however, is currently under attack. Implementing
the critics' proposals to undermine Fed independence would
harm the Fed's ability to act as a necessary counterweight to
other policymakers, especially during a real or potential crisis,
as we describe below in Parts III and IV. Before coming to those
arguments, in Part II we summarize the proposals of the Fed's
critics.
II
CRITICISMS OF THE FED
Proposals to "end" or "audit" the Fed come from critics on
both the right and the left. In some respects the various criti-
ques converge, but they also differ on key points. Perhaps
more important than sorting conservative from progressive cri-
tiques of the Fed is the task of sorting along another axis:
between those critiques that, if credited as fair, could be ad-
dressed by relatively minor statutory amendments and those
that pose a challenge to Fed independence with respect to its
fundamental role in making monetary policy decisions, to act
as a lender of last resort, and to coordinate its regulatory role
with its policymaking role. This Part briefly describes the lead-
ing objections with an eye to this latter dichotomy. Because we
conclude that some of the criticisms, if credited, really would
set the stage for seriously curtailing Fed independence, we turn
in the subsequent Parts to underscoring the practical and the-
oretical grounds for supporting such independence.
A. Statutory Authority
During and after the 2008 financial crisis, various critics
complained that the Fed acted beyond its statutory authority.
The most common complaint was that the Fed created dummy
entities in order to purchase private assets that it lacked the




bailouts of two systemically important financial institutions:
Bear Steams (in the lead-up to the crisis) and AIG (at the height
of the crisis). The critics argue that while the Fed has the
emergency power to extend credit on favorable terms, 7 4 the
power of the Fed (and the regional banks in the Federal Reserve
System) to purchase assets generally extends only to govern-
ment-issued instruments,'7 5 with such powers as the Fed does
have to purchase private assets circumscribed by collateral
requirements, time limits, and other constraints.7 6 According
to one critic, in creating special-purpose vehicles to bail out
Bear Steams and AIG, "the Fed attempted to use legal trickery
to disguise its illegal purchases of private assets from these
companies," and thus "acted outside the scope of its statutory
authority by effectively purchasing assets that did not fall
within the narrow purchase authority provided by the Fed-
eral Reserve Act."7 7  Other commentators draw similar
conclusions. 78
Are the critics right? Were the Bear Stearns and AIG
bailouts illegal? We think the answer is not entirely clear-cut.
We agree that the transactions were loans in form but
purchases in substance. Yet it does not obviously follow that
they were illegal. The law sometimes disregards form in favor
of function, but not always. Moreover, at the relevant time, no
statutory provision expressly forbade the Fed from using its
lending authority to accomplish de facto purchases. The argu-
ment for finding in the Federal Reserve Act a tacit prohibition
on asset purchases rests on the assumption that if Congress
meant to delegate purchase authority to the Fed it would have
done so expressly because where Congress did delegate such
authority, it came with limits. Silence in this context, goes the
argument, is a denial of authority.
Nonetheless, two factors point in the other direction. First,
the very idea of emergency lending authority connotes some
flexibility. Part of what makes an emergency an emergency is
the fact that prior actions did not or could not prepare for the
existing circumstances. Thus, one might think that emergency
74 See Federal Reserve Act § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
75 See Federal Reserve Act § 14(b), 12 U.S.C. § 355 (2006).
76 See 12 U.S.C. § 344 (2006) (authorizing secured purchase of bills of ex-
change backed by certain non-perishable agricultural products, provided the as-
sets are held by the Fed for no longer than ninety days).
77 Emerson, supra note 11, at 128.
78 See, e.g., Duff, supra note 12, at 202 n.59 (arguing that the Fed circum-
vented the limits on its purchase authority); Mehra, supra note 12, at 235-36
(arguing that the Fed disguised forbidden purchases as authorized loans).
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authority should be treated as sufficiently elastic to meet the
pressing needs of the moment. As Adam Levitin explains, while
it is true that the Fed's lending authority was envisioned as
authorizing measures to provide liquidity rather than to ensure
the solvency of particular firms, during crises (including the
last crisis), the line between liquidity and solvency blurs.79
Second, as Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule note, even if
the best reading of the statutes would render the Bear Steams
and AIG bailouts unlawful, standard administrative law doc-
trine grants to agencies the power to adopt a reasonable con-
struction of the statutes they administer, even if that
construction is not the construction that a court would give the
statutes considering the matter de novo.80 They acknowledge
that the AIG bailout was "a loan in form" but "a purchase in
substance."8 1 Nonetheless, they conclude that "[a] court might
find that, in the circumstances, the Fed's implicit interpreta-
tion of the statute to permit purchases of distressed nonbank
firms in emergency conditions was reasonable."8 2
We think it is, at the very least, uncertain whether the
Fed's bailouts of Bear Steams and AIG were legal. However,
even if one is persuaded that the Fed acted beyond its statutory
authority, and thus illegally, that does not necessarily point to
any systemic problem calling for a systemic remedy. The argu-
ment that the Fed's actions were legal is at least nonfrivolous,
and it should hardly come as a surprise that agencies occa-
sionally assert powers beyond their statutory mandates. When
an agency does so, absent judicial intervention, the proper
remedy is for Congress to clarify prospectively that the agency
either possesses or lacks the relevant power.
Here Congress chose the latter course. Section 1101(a) of
the Dodd-Frank Act8 3 amended Section 13 of the Federal Re-
serve Act to clarify that henceforward any Fed "program or
79 After acknowledging that Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act was not
intended as a bailout mechanism, Levitin explains that "the difficulty that the Fed
encountered when dealing with AIG was that liquidity and solvency support bled
into each other." Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 498
(2011). Moreover, quite apart from technical considerations, Levitin cautions that
"binding ourselves to eschew [lender-of-last-resort] behavior [by our central bank]
would amount to an economic suicide pact." Id. at 499.
80 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 n.9 (1984) (announcing the presumption that Congress delegates authority to
the agencies it has created to interpret legal questions that cannot be resolved by
"traditional tools of statutory"); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 1630.
81 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 14, at 1630.
82 Id.
83 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, Title XI, § 1101(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2113 (2010).
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facility that is structured to remove assets from the balance
sheet of a single and specific company" is ineligible for the sort
of emergency lending that the Fed used in combination with
the creation of a special purpose vehicle during the financial
crisis.8 4
Whether that was the right judgment is also uncertain. If
one thinks, as we do, that the Bear Stearns and AIG bailouts
were important measures to stabilize the economy, then one
would want to clarify that the Fed has the tools to take similar
measures in the event of a future crisis. However, viewed ex
ante, one might think that by clearly denying the Fed the power
to relieve financial firms of their toxic assets, Dodd-Frank
removes an incentive for firms to accumulate risky assets that
may turn toxic. In this view, Dodd-Frank binds the Fed to the
mast when the financial seas are calm, thus signaling to large
interconnected firms that the Fed will have no choice but to
resist their siren song in the event that their investment strat-
egy threatens to crash the global economy; thus, they will not
undertake systemically risky investment strategies in the first
place. Similarly, the Fed will have even more reason to be
vigilant in monitoring financial developments and preventing
crises from developing, lest it find itself faced with another
crisis after having been stripped of its best policy response.
We express no view on whether Congress made the right
decision by clarifying in Dodd-Frank that the Fed lacks both de
jure and de facto authority to purchase troubled financial as-
sets. For our purposes it suffices to note that the questions
about the legality of the Fed bailouts of Bear Stearns and AIG
do not rise to the level of a structural problem calling for a
structural solution such as ending or auditing the Fed.
Nor does Dodd-Frank's clarification of any prior ambiguity
in the Federal Reserve Act touch on the central issue of Fed
independence. The Fed bailed out Bear Stearns and AIG be-
cause no other institution of government was able to do so in a
timely fashion, and it had at least a colorable claim of author-
ity. But bailouts need not be a core function of a central bank.
True, just as there are reasons of political economy to vest
monetary policy in an independent central bank, there are sim-
ilar reasons to vest bailout authority in a financial actor that is
independent of short-term political pressure. In this context
too, political accountability can lead to dangerous departures
84 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(B)(i) (2012).
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from sound economic policy. 8 5 And arguably, considerations of
expertise suggest that the power to bail out systemically impor-
tant firms ought to be given to the same independent central
bank that already addresses other matters of macroeconomic
policy through loans as well as purchases and sales of financial
assets.
However, it is also possible to delegate bailout authority to
some other independent agency. The Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) has long had resolution authority for a
class of depositary institutions, and Title II of Dodd-Frank ex-
panded its role with respect to systemically important financial
institutions. 6 Whether or not the Fed, rather than some other
independent agency, has bailout authority simply does not
bear on Fed independence with respect to monetary policy. As
noted in Part I, separating these functions would necessitate
some coordination among agencies that could, at least during a
crisis, functionally turn those separate agencies into a single
decision-making unit, but that is not necessarily a problem. It
would not be our first choice to separate these functions, but
separating them would say nothing about the wisdom of main-
taining the Fed's ability to act as lender of last resort (because
the FDIC would, if the crisis were large enough, run out of
money), and to conduct independent monetary policy.
Does this mean that the complaints by critics that the Fed
broke the law during the financial crisis can be ignored as
irrelevant to our project? Probably, but not necessarily. We
acknowledge that a longstanding pattern of law breaking by a
government agency would be cause for dramatically reforming,
85 See Duff, supra note 12, at 204 ("The same basic rationale for delegating
authority over monetary policy to an independent agency applies to financial
stability policy."); Levitin, supra note 79, at 505 ("Political accountability ... can
also make bailout policy driven by electoral concerns . . . .").
86 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 5381-94 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 380 (2015); Kwon-Yong Jin, Note, How to
Eat an Elephant Corporate Group Structure of Systemically Important Financial
Institutions, Orderly Liquidation Authority, and Single Point of Entry Resolution,
124 YALE L.J. 1746, 1750-51 (2015) (discussing a regulatory gap closed by Dodd-
Frank); Martin J. Gruenberg, Acting Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks
to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Structure Conference (May 10,
2012) (transcript available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/
archives/2012/spmay1012.html [https://perma.cc/2WZ4-DFBVI) (arguing for
broad resolution authority in the FDIC); Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks to the Peterson Institute for International Econom-
ics: A Progress Report on the Resolution of Systemically Important Financial
Institutions (May 12, 2015) (transcript available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/
news/speeches/spmayl2 15.html [https://perma.cc/546G-EW67) (explaining
the FDIC's role under Dodd-Frank as a supplement to ordinary bankruptcy
procedures).
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or even abolishing, that agency. However, in our view, the
claim that the Fed exceeded its authority in the Bear Stearns
and AIG bailouts, even when fully credited, does not come close
to demonstrating a pattern of law breaking. The bailouts, the
complaint that they were illegal, and the congressional re-
sponse in Dodd-Frank were an important episode in and after
the financial crisis, but they do not bear on the fundamental
question of central bank independence. 7
B. Transparency
Critics also charge that the Fed is insufficiently transpar-
ent.88 The validity of this criticism varies with respect to task.
The Fed achieves its various objectives through two kinds of
actions. In stabilizing the macroeconomy, the Fed buys and
sells financial assets, especially Treasury securities. Although
situated differently from private actors, in taking such actions,
the Fed functions as a kind of market actor. Meanwhile, the
Fed also has regulatory authority over various market actors.
In carrying out its role as regulator, the Fed operates much like
any other agency, promulgating rules and bringing enforce-
ment actions.8 9
In carrying out its regulatory mandates, the Fed ought to
be-and is-no less transparent than most other agencies. In
87 We have focused in this subpart on the critics' strongest case, based on the
claim that the Bear Stearns and AIG bailouts were outside of the authority of the
Fed under Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act. Some critics argue that in
engineering the Bear Steams bailout the Fed abused its authority to grant exemp-
tions from limits on Fed lending under Section 23A of the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 371c
(2012). Without that exemption, the extension of credit to J.P. Morgan to acquire
Bear Steams would have been clearly unlawful. See, e.g., Orticelli, supra note 18,
at 670 (noting that absent the exemption "the statute would expressly prohibit
JPMorgan . . . from taking over Bear"). More broadly, on multiple occasions
following the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market, the Fed granted exemp-
tions from Section 23A's limits. "Under the circumstances, the Board's chosen
course of action may have been well justified, if not inevitable ... [but] the crisis-
driven exemptions from section 23A, which purposely exposed banks to risks
associated with their affiliates' nonbanking business and transferred federal sub-
sidy outside the depository system, were not, and could not have been, consistent
with the fundamental purposes of that statute." Omarova, supra note 18, at
1762-63. Although we agree with this assessment, even in combination with the
claims regarding violations of Section 13, it does not lead to the conclusion that
the Fed is lawless.
88 See supra note 20; LABONTE, FEDERAL RESERVE: OVERSIGHT AND DISCLOSURE
ISSUES, supra note 11, at 9-10; Emerson, supra note 11, at 133-37 (pointing to
laws that render Fed decision-making relatively opaque to outsiders).
89 12 U.S.C. § 248 (2012); Enforcement Actions, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES.
SYs., http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/enforcementactions/ [https://
perma.cc/ZU79-BHAR] (last updated Sept. 9, 2014) (listing the entities against
which the Fed has authority to take enforcement actions).
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general, modem administrative law strikes a balance between
deference to agency expertise and accountability by imposing
procedural constraints on agency rulemaking, enforcement ac-
tions, and adjudication. More than anything, these constraints
aim to expose the reasons for agency decision-making-that is,
to render agency action transparent. The Fed falls within the
sweeping definition of covered agencies in the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 90 and thus, as a regulator, it is legally as
transparent as any other agency9 1-and more transparent, at
least as a formal matter, than those agencies that are specifl-
cally exempt from the APA. With respect to rulemaking, for
example, like any other agency covered by the APA, if the Fed
wishes its regulations to receive deference in court, it must
follow the notice-and-comment procedure affording the public
rights to participate.9 2
90 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).
91 Consider a recent example of accountability via transparency and partici-
pation afforded by the APA. "After evaluating thousands of comments" on its
proposed rule, the Fed "issued a Final Rule that" differed substantially from its
original proposal. NACS v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 746 F.3d
474, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (upholding credit card regulation).
92 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015) (noting
that mere "interpretative rules" issued outside the notice-and-comment process
lack "the force and effect of law and are not accorded that weight in the adjudica-
tory process") (quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995)).
Courts grant rules promulgated by independent agencies the same degree of
deference that they grant to rules that emanate from executive branch agencies.
But cf Andrew T. Bond, Note, Parting the Chevron Sea An Argument for Chevron's
Greater Applicability to Cabinet than Independent Agencies, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
397, 411-17 (2014) (criticizing but acknowledging this feature of administrative
law). To be sure, according to some versions of the so-called unitary executive
theory, by vesting "The executive Power" in the president, Article II entirely fore-
closes execution of the law by independent agencies. See, e.g., Steven G. Cala-
bresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1153, 1165-68 (1992). However, many of the regula-
tory activities of the Fed and other independent agencies do not amount to execu-
tion of the law. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624 (1935)
(distinguishing "quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative" agency action from executive
action). Moreover, even with respect to execution, there may be reasons to exempt
financial regulation from a putative more general constitutional requirement that
law execution be accountable through the president. See Dina Mishra, An Execu-
tive-Power Non-Delegation Doctrine for the Private Administration of Federal Law,
68 VAND. L. REv. 1509, 1602 (2015) (explaining that financial regulation "may be"
a "context[ ] in which the need for political impartiality is particularly strong," and
thus where any requirement of accountability through the president would be
appropriately relaxed). Even if the Fed cannot be distinguished from other inde-
pendent agencies, we treat general arguments about the constitutionality of inde-
pendent agencies as beyond the scope of this Article. We assume the
longstanding status quo permitting Congress to create independent agencies to be
constitutional, and focus, chiefly in Part IV, on whether there are sufficient policy
justifications for retaining Fed independence.
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Perhaps it could be argued that because the Fed, as an
independent agency, is not politically accountable, it ought to
be subject to stricter transparency requirements than execu-
tive branch agencies. This argument would, in our view, be
mistaken. As we shall explain momentarily,9 3 at some point,
increased transparency amounts to external control. Yet if it
makes sense, all things considered, to grant some regulatory
task to an independent agency rather than to an executive
branch agency, then it also makes sense to impose no greater
transparency requirements on the independent agency; doing
so would render the independent agency de facto politically
accountable, which would be inconsistent with the initial judg-
ment to make the agency independent.
To be clear, we do not need to quarrel with the claim that
some of the regulatory missions now assigned to the Fed might
be better assigned to a politically accountable actor, such as
the Treasury Department. We take no position on that issue.
Our point is only that so long as Congress has good reason to
assign a regulatory task to an independent agency like the Fed,
Congress also has good reason not to subject the agency to
stricter transparency obligations than are thought appropriate
for executive agencies engaged in regulation.
For our purposes, the more important question is whether
the Fed is insufficiently transparent with respect to monetary
policy. As then-Chair of the Fed Ben Bernanke acknowledged
in a 2010 speech, the case for transparency of the Fed's mar-
ket-participant functions is weaker than for the actions the Fed
undertakes as a regulator.9 4 But even in the course of cham-
pioning central bank independence, Bernanke acknowledged
that weaker does not mean nonexistent, and Fed monetary
policy is in fact somewhat open to public scrutiny. Fed chairs
regularly testify before Congress and give speeches, while the
FOMC-which sets monetary policy-releases minutes of its
meetings and issues reports.9 5 These measures, Bernanke ar-
gued, "provide[ ] substantial grist for the activities of legions of
93 See infra text accompanying notes 99-102.
94 See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Central Bank Independence, Transparency, and Accountability, Speech at the
Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies International Conference, Bank of
Japan, Tokyo, Japan (May 25, 2010), (transcript available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100525a.htm [https://
perma.cc/2DSL-E9FN) ("[Tihe independence afforded central banks for the mak-
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'Fed watchers' who analyze all aspects of monetary policy in
great detail."9 6
Bernanke was and is correct that the Fed is not a secret
cabal. Still, it can be argued that after-the-fact transparency
does little good for those politicians and private actors who
disagree with Fed policy. When undertaking notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking pursuant to the APA, the Fed, like other
agencies, must give the public an opportunity to comment on
its proposed action and then actually give consideration to the
public's input before proceeding.9 7 By contrast, although the
Fed can fairly be said to tell interested observers what it is
doing and why, there are no direct mechanisms for those ob-
servers to challenge the Fed's actions. As David Zaring ob-
serves, the FOMC is, in practice, "an agency governed by
internally developed tradition in lieu of externally imposed
constraints."98
Yet a transparency obligation, even without any mecha-
nism for direct regulation, can act as a form of behavior modifi-
cation for the actor subject to the obligation. Transparency
requirements for private firms99 as well as public actors'oo
often work on the principle that sunlight is the best disinfec-
tant. 0 1 At the same time, requirements of complete trans-
parency can backfire-as when open meeting laws have the
unintended but foreseeable consequence of driving the real ac-
tion outside of the meeting and thus outside of the spotlight.1 0 2
96 Id.
97 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 54-57 (1983) (rejecting agency's rescission of passive restraint
requirement as arbitrary and capricious where it failed to offer adequate basis and
explanation for its action).
98 David Zaring, Law and Custom on the Federal Open Market Committee, 78
IAw & CoNTEMP. PROBs. 157, 158 (2015).
99 See Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Stand-
ing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 613, 618-29 (1999) (cataloguing and
evaluating various regimes of regulation via transparency requirements).
100 The federal Freedom of Information Act and open meeting requirements, 5
U.S.C. § 552 (2012), along with their state analogues, are examples.
101 Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER'S WEEKLY, Dec. 20, 1913,
at 10, http://3197d6dl4b5fl9f2f440-5el3d29c4cOl6cf96cbbfdl97c579b45.r81.
cfl.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1910/1913_12_20_WhatPublicityCa.pdf
[https://perma.ce/2PV7-VE9P] ("Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants . . . .").
102 See, e.g., 3 UNITED STATES CONSTHUTIONAL CONVENTION, THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 479 (Max Farrand ed. 1911) (quoting James
Madison on the need for privacy during the Constitutional Convention of 1787);
James Bowen, Behind Closed Doors: Re-Examining the Tennessee Open Meetings
Act and Its Inapplicability to the Tennessee General Assembly, 35 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBS. 133, 134 (2002) (promoting "a zone of privacy in which ... discus-
sions can freely take place [because slunshine laws present the real possibility of
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Most deliberative bodies need at least some opportunities to
meet in private so that members can speak freely. Even absent
any illicit motives, both private and public actors will hesitate
to give voice to positions that they wish to explore tentatively
for fear that the public or a subset thereof will overreact.
Where the relevant actors are the policy makers of a central
bank-and with global markets finely attuned to interest
rates-the risk is acute.
There are also questions of practicality. Each day the Fed
(or more precisely, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, act-
ing on behalf of the FOMC) purchases and sells financial assets
in order to carry out monetary policy. 103 These numerous
transactions could not possibly achieve their aim in real time if
they were subject to the sort of back and forth with the public
associated with notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Accordingly, during a July 2015 appearance before the
House Financial Services Committee, Fed Chair Janet Yellen
resisted calls for greater direct oversight of the Fed, treating
proposed transparency requirements as a form of congres-
sional control. 1 0 4 One need not agree with Yellen that current
law requires exactly the right degree of Fed transparency to see
two general truths: first, that for just about any entity, there is
an optimal level of transparency that falls short of total trans-
parency; and second, that given the tendency of transparency
to bleed into external control, where policy factors justify mak-
ing an agency independent of direct external political control,
the optimal level of transparency for that agency will be some-
deleterious incidental effects.") (footnote omitted); Tim Groseclose & Nolan Mc-
Carty, The Politics of Blame: Bargaining Before an Audience, 45 AM. J. POL. SC.
100, 114 (2001) (finding a chilling effect of sunshine laws); Rebecca M. Kysar,
Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 519, 531 (2009) ("[Transparency may promote polarization and partisanship
in the political dialogue.") (footnote omitted).
103 FED. RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND, THE FEDERAL RESERVE TODAY 12 (16th ed.
2012), https://www.richmondfed.org/-/media/richmondfedorg/publications/
education/federal reservetoday/frtoday.pdf [https://perma.cc/47XC-JWP7]
(describing how the Open Market Committee conducts monetary policy); Open
Market Operations, FED. RES. BANK N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/about-
thefed/fedpoint/fed32.html [https://perma.cc/4FWY-N7XB] (explaining the role
of the New York Fed); What We Do, FED. RES. BANK N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.
org/aboutthefed/whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/7YLY-X5CE] (same).
104 See Binyamin Appelbaum, Janet Yellen Warns Congress Against Adding to
Fed's Oversight, N.Y. TIMEs (Jul. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/
16/business/yellen-federal-reserve-house-testimony-oversight.html [https://
perma.cc/DUX5-LUNA] (quoting Fed Chair Yellen stating that "[e]fforts to further
increase transparency, no matter how well intentioned, must avoid unintended
consequences that could undermine the Federal Reserve's ability to make policy
in the long-run best interest of American families and businesses").
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what less (other things being equal) than the optimal level of
transparency for agencies deemed properly subject to such
control.1 0 5
Thus, the claim that the Fed is insufficiently transparent
has two dimensions. To the extent that the critics wish to see
the Fed subject to greater transparency requirements in its
regulatory functions, they may or may not have a point, but
even if they do, greater transparency in this domain would not
undermine the Fed's core functions when it acts as a central
bank. This aspect of the claim touches nothing fundamental.
However, to the extent that the critics would like to see greater
transparency in the Fed's conduct of monetary policy as a
means of controlling such policy, the prescription would un-
dermine Fed independence in an area where such indepen-
dence has been thought essential to its role as a central bank.
C. Substantive Priorities
The Fed's substantive mandate obligates it to set and carry
out monetary policy in such a manner that will "maintain long
run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensu-
rate with the economy's long run potential to increase produc-
tion, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest
rates."106 As we noted briefly in Part I, these objectives can
conflict. Other things being equal, and when the economy
lacks substantial excess capacity, lower interest rates boost
employment but also increase the risk of inflation, and vice-
versa. Accordingly, actors with different interests will some-
times criticize the Fed for unduly emphasizing one aspect of its
mandate at the expense of another. To paint with a very broad
brush, conservatives would like the Fed to focus chiefly on
fighting inflation, while progressives would like to see the Fed
promote economic growth and thus job growth. 10 7
105 These are general rather than universal truths. Consider military affairs.
Article II enshrines civilian control of the military by making the president Com-
mander in Chief. The armed forces thus are not an independent agency. How-
ever, the need for operational secrecy will often be inconsistent with transparency
to the general public or even to all of Congress.
106 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2012).
107 See, e.g., Michelle A.L. Goldberg, Note, The Fed's Dual Mandate: One Too
Many?, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 343, 352 (2013) (detailing Democratic support
for and Republican opposition to the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act,
which made explicit the unemployment prong of the Fed's dual mandate); Mark
Felsenthal, Fed Officials Not Attached to Dual Mandate, REuTERs (Jan. 9, 2011,
5:38 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/09/us-usa-fed-mandate-id
USTRE70839720110109 [https://perma.cc/RWZ6-ULS6] (quoting Mike Pence,
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It is tempting to say that if the Fed is simultaneously being
criticized from the right for being too soft on inflation while
being criticized from the left for being too soft on unemploy-
ment, then it must be doing its job just right by steering a
middle course, consistent with its multi-factor mandate. But
that is not necessarily correct. Although economists disagree
about the relative contribution of the price shock in oil and
monetary policy in causing stagflation in the 1970s, 10 there is
little doubt that a poorly run central bank (in combination with
external public and private factors) can set and conduct mone-
tary policy in a way that neither constrains inflation nor pro-
motes job growth. The very possibility of stagflation shows that
monetary policy is not necessarily a zero-sum game, with every
action that exacerbates one problem necessarily contributing
to a solution to the converse problem.
The post-2008 crisis period provides another, more posi-
tive example of how inflation and unemployment are not
strictly inversely correlated. Despite repeated dire warnings by
conservatives that extremely low interest rates would lead to
then the No. 3 House Republican (and currently Governor of Indiana and Republi-
can Vice Presidential nominee), saying that the Fed "could do more for the Ameri-
can economy by focusing singularly on maintaining the value of the dollar and
protecting the purchasing power of Americans . . . ."); see also id. ("[With the
Democrats in control of the White House and the Senate, a move to strip the Fed's
employment mandate would be unlikely to gain sufficient backing to become
law."); Arjun Kapur, Janet Yellen and the Future of the Federal Reserve, HARV. POL.
REv. (Dec. 31, 2013, 12:49 AM), http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/anet-
yellen-future-federal-reserve/ [https://perma.cc/D3SC-BN2V] ("One might ex-
pect Republicans to run a tight monetary policy and Democrats an easy
one . . . .").
108 See Alan S. Blinder & Jeremy B. Rudd, The Supply Shock Explanation of
the Great Stagflation Revisited 46 (Princeton Ctr. for Econ. Policy Studies, Work-
ing Paper No. 176) (2008), https://www.princeton.edu/ceps/workingpapers/176
blinder.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AR4-TSMV] (concluding that supply shocks were
chiefly responsible for unemployment during stagflation-60% and 45% in the
1970s and 1980-82, respectively-with monetary policy playing only a minor
role). But see Robert B. Barsky & Lutz Kilian, Do We Really Know that Otl Caused
the Great Stagflation? A Monetary Alternative, 16 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL
137, 163-70 (2002), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11065.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3NJY-KZU2] (arguing that exogenous oil supply shocks alone were in-
sufficient to cause stagflation in the 1970s); see also Robert B. Barsky & Lutz
Kilian, Oil and the Macroeconomy Since the 1970s, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 133
(2004) https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/meltzer/jep_2004_barsky_1utz_oil
macro.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8YE-P8BH] ("[Ol price shocks are neither neces-
sary nor sufficient to explain stagflation in real GDP and in the implicit GDP
deflator."); Lutz Kilian, Oil Price Shocks, Monetary Policy, and Stagflation 64-70,
(Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. DP7324, 2009), http://
www-personal.umich.edu/-kilian/rbakilianpub.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5Y8-
GTRQ] (suggesting that exogenous oil price shocks led to stagflation because the
Fed raised interest rates in response to the resulting inflationary pressures).
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runaway inflation, 109 the Fed's policy-including effectively
negative interest rates for some of the recent period 1 1o-has
not led to high inflation, even though that policy has been in
place for almost eight years.
Meanwhile, some of the policy preferences expressed by
some conservatives are, to put the point politely, not exactly
reality-based. The charge that the Fed has debased the cur-
rency1 11 could most charitably be understood as a shorthand
for the mistaken but not completely irrational fear that in-
creases in the money supply would lead to inflation. This view
is mistaken because the link between low interest rates and
inflation depends on the economy functioning at or close to full
capacity. 1 1 2 However, the fear is not irrational because timing
is delicate. It is at least possible that a central banker could
109 See, e.g., Merrill Goozner, Bernanke Defends Low Interest Rates as Neces-
sary, FIscAL TIMES (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/
02/02/Bernanke-Defends-Low-Interest-Rates-As-Necessary [https://perma.cc/
GM2Y-6M2P] (citing Republican Congressman Paul Ryan's warning that low in-
terest rates would lead to higher inflation); Victoria McGrane, GOP Senate Take-
over Puts Fed on Hot Seat, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2014, 12:11 AM), http://www.wsj.
com/articles/gop-senate-takeover-would-put-fed-under-microscope- 141510
4673 [https://perma.cc/SX7S-YLTS] (explaining that Alabama Senator Richard
Shelby voted against Janet Yellen due to her support for bond-buying programs,
which he believed would lead to inflation); Cliff Asnes et. al., Open Letter to Ben
Bernanke, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/econom
ics/2010/11/15/open-letter-to-ben-bernanke/ [https://perma.cc/VIAB-EHST]
(warning that quantitative easing would result in inflation).
110 Richard G. Anderson & Yang Liu, How Low Can You Go? Negative Interest
Rates and Investors' Flight to Safety, REGIONAL ECON.: FED. RES. BANK ST. Louis,
Jan. 2013, https://www.stlouisfed.org/-/media/Files/PDFs/publications/pub
assets/pdf/re/2013/a/investments.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7FS-2LJY] (calcu-
lating real interest rates as negative); Diana A. Cooke & William T. Gavin, The Ups
and Downs of Inflation and the Role of Fed Credibility, REGIONAL ECON.: FED. RES.
BANK ST. Louis, Apr. 2014, https://www.stlouisfed.org/-/media/Files/PDFs/
publications/pub assets/pdf/re/20 14/b/credibility.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5GG5-9JZH] (same).
111 See, e.g., Lerer & Hirschfeld Davis, supra note 11 (quoting then vice presi-
dential candidate Paul Ryan saying "[tlhere is nothing more insidious that a
government can do to its countrymen than to debase its currency-yet this is in
fact what is occurring"); Paul Krugman, Opinion, Money Makes Crazy, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/opinion/paul-krugman-
money-makes-crazy.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/D8TX-CM69] ("Mr. Paul likes
to warn that the Fed's efforts to bolster the economy may lead to hyperinflation;
he loves talking about the wheelbarrows of cash that people carted around in
Weimar Germany.").
112 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Check Out Our Low, Low (Natural) Rates, N.Y.
TIMES: THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (Oct. 28, 2015, 10:34 AM), http://krugman.
blogs.nytimes.com/2015/10/28/check-out-our-low-low-natural-rates/ [https://
perma.cc/WAV4-Z5GS] (noting, in the sixth year after the recession officially en-
ded, that "we've had multiple years of very low rates, with no hint of a runaway
boom or an inflationary takeoff").
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keep interest rates too low too long out of the erroneous belief
that the economy has more excess capacity than it in fact has.
Yet some Fed critics pretty clearly do not simply mean their
objections as shorthand for a view about the timing of interest
rate increases. Rather, in the period since the crisis, some
commentators have issued the debasement charge based on
the apparent belief that increasing the money supply is inher-
ently problematic. For example, the complaint that that the
Fed's policy of quantitative easing created money "out of thin
air" 113 assumes as a baseline some definition of money that is
not created out of thin air. Yet that assumption is unwar-
ranted. Any medium of exchange-including precious metal-
has value only because people believe that other people will
continue to believe that it has value. There are sound reasons
why, in particular circumstances, the money supply ought not
to be increased, but the mere fact that a central bank in a
sovereign nation with its own currency can increase the money
supply without having to discover and dig up nuggets of a
material that is arbitrarily denominated as valuable is not itself
a ground for concern. 114
Likewise, calls by some on the right to amend the Fed's
mandate so that it only focuses on inflation' 1 5 cannot be taken
at face value. A central bank that viewed its mission as solely
and constantly battling inflation would risk sending the econ-
113 See supra note 13.
114 Moreover, even those countries that wish to tie their currency to such
nuggets of a precious metal must still set policies that determine how much
currency is supported by a given weight of the metal. Setting that amount is
monetary policy. The only question is who should set that policy. Our argument
is not that we must choose between a system with a human element and one that
is purely mechanical. Instead, we must choose between systems on the basis of
which humans, in which institutional arrangements, will make those policy deci-
sions. See infra text accompanying notes 120-122.
115 See LABONTE, CHANGING THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S MANDATE, supra note 15, at
Summary (describing bills that "would strike the goal of maximum employment
from the mandate, leaving a single goal of price stability, and require the Fed to
adopt an inflation target"); Goldberg, supra note 107, at 368 (citing Daniel Thorn-
ton of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for the proposition that most econo-
mists do not support the dual mandate because they believe either that
unemployment is affected by economic fundamentals distinct from monetary po-
lice or price stability alone check unemployment); Victoria McGrane & Kristina
Peterson, For Yellen, Fed's Dual Mandate Guides Thinking, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12,
2013, 7:31 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023048684045
79194300406860572 [https://perma.cc/ADU7-T8KB] ("[Slome Republicans
think the employment component has taken the Fed's focus off the more impor-
tant and achievable mission of low inflation."), Timothy Lavin, End the Fed's Dual




2016] DON'T END OR AUDIT THE FED 39
omy into a deflationary spiral that could easily turn into a
depression. No one could sensibly advocate that the Fed target
a zero rate of inflation because even a small error on the wrong
side could yield deflation. Accordingly, the rational version of
the conservative critique of the Fed's multi-prong mandate
must be that the critics wish to see the balance struck differ-
ently. So long as there is no serious risk of deflation, the critics
mean (or at least ought) to say that the Fed ought not permit
additional inflation as the price of promoting job growth.
That claim finds its mirror in a criticism by progressives
that, notwithstanding its multi-prong mandate, too often the
Fed has prioritized fighting inflation over promoting economic
and job growth.1 16 This critique sometimes has an institu-
tional component. The Fed is a hybrid public/private entity
that gives substantially greater weight to the interests and out-
look of bankers and investors than to the interests of Ameri-
cans who live from paycheck to paycheck. Accordingly, the
argument goes, the Fed is rigged to favor its inflation-fighting
mandate at the expense of job growth.' 1 7
This charge strikes us as simplistic and unrealistic. It is
certainly true that workers (for example) are not directly repre-
sented in the Fed's monetary-policy-making processes. But it
does not follow that their interests are unrepresented, partly
because economic progressives are not the only people who
(other things being equal) prefer low interest rates. Investors in
116 See LABONTE, CHANGING THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S MANDATE, supra note 15, at 4
("It is debatable whether an inflation target is compatible with the equal weighting
of maximum employment and price stability in the dual mandate-arguably, it
communicates to the public a greater focus on inflation. . . ."); George A. Kahn &
Lisa Taylor, Evolving Market Perceptions ofFederal Reserve Policy Objectives, FED.
REs. BANK KAN. CnY EcON. REv., First Quarter 2014, at 5, https://www.kansascity
fed.org/publicat/econrev/pdf/ 14qlKahn-Taylor.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9H6-
9FSW] ("[Diuring the Volcker era when inflation was deemed excessive, policy-
makers placed a high priority on lowering inflation even at the expense of high
and rising unemployment. During the Greenspan era, as further disinflation was
achieved, polcymakers emphasized 'sustainable economic growth,' with a view
that such an outcome could be achieved only in an environment of low and stable
inflation."); Thornton, supra note 15, at 128 (noting that former Fed Chairman
Paul Volcker made a case for "inflation first" monetary policy); Cameron DeHart,
The Federal Reserve's Dual Mandate: Balancing Act or Inflation Fixation? 5 (Apr.
16, 2013) (unpublished honors research thesis, The Ohio State University) (on file
with The Ohio State University Knowledge Bank), , https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/
bitstream/handle/ 1811/63984/DeHart HonorsThesis.pdf?sequence= 1 [https:/
/perma.cc/VWS4-NJX4} ("The Fed uses its independence to re-interpret the 'dual
mandate' such that price stability is a precondition for maximum employment.")
(emphasis omitted); Id. at 11 ("[Alnalytical evidence suggests that the Fed was
decidedly more focused on inflation during the observed time period."); see also
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 15.
117 See supra notes 14-15.
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stocks and holders of existing bonds like low interest rates as
well.1 18 Thus, insofar as the Fed's structure gives weight to the
preferences of investors, that does not systematically disfavor
pro-growth policies. And indeed, the Fed's record since the
crisis (and, somewhat less consistently, before the crisis as
well) shows that whatever else one might say about the Fed, it
has hardly been captured by inflation hawks.
To be clear, we do not claim that the Fed is a "Goldilocks"
agency, always setting monetary policy neither too much in one
or the other direction but always "just right." We are keenly
aware that when inflation and growth correlate inversely, as
they often do, it is possible for the Fed to err in one way or the
other. Whether one thinks that the Fed has erred, or over time
likely will err, in either direction will depend on one's interests
and outlook. Our concern here is how judgments about the
Fed's priorities might translate into concrete reforms.
In principle, it should be possible to set different priorities
for the Fed without challenging Fed independence. For exam-
ple, the Fed's statutory mandate could be rewritten to specify a
numerical target of, say, two percent annual inflation, or three
percent unemployment, or some particular formula that incor-
porated both-for example, minimize unemployment unless fur-
ther steps to promote employment would cause inflation to rise
above two percent.
In practice, however, the diversity of economic circum-
stances that can arise will mean that a rigid numerical formula
will likely lead to a policy path that even a proponent of the
formula would regard as suboptimal. For example, even hold-
ing inflation constant, there will be disagreement about the so-
called natural rate of unemployment, and a statutory mandate
based on assumptions that prove false over time could lead to a
Fed that is bound by that mandate to adopt harmful monetary
policies. In a macroeconomy that can fairly be described as
subject to the influence of "animal spirits,"' 19 any rule-like
approach to a central bank's mandate will leave the central
bank with insufficient flexibility to rein in those spirits.
The solution-embodied in the Fed's existing multi-factor
mandate-is to delegate to the central bank the discretion to
118 ANDREW B. ABEL, BEN S. BERNANKE, & DEAN CROUSHORE, MACROECONOMICS
141 (6th ed. 2008) ("[A] higher real interest rate increases the user cost of capital
and thus reduces desired investment."); N. GREGORY MANKlW, MACROECONOMICS 421
(6th ed. 2007) (stating that higher interest rates lead to decreases in investment).
119 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND
MONEY 161 (1936).
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make an all-things-considered judgment about how to balance
the sometimes-conflicting goals of monetary policy. This solu-
tion should be very familiar to anyone acquainted with the
modem administrative state. Given the complexity and fluidity
of the problem, a generalist legislature cannot formulate sensi-
ble precise rules in advance and so sets the broad outlines of
the policy, leaving to the agency the task of filling in the details.
Accordingly, whether one thinks that the Fed tends to favor
too-loose or too-strict monetary policy, one cannot sensibly
propose ex ante formulaic controls on the Fed. This may ex-
plain why, regardless of where they fall on the political spec-
trum, many critics of the balance the Fed has struck among the
factors in its multi-factor mandate seek to subject the Fed to
ongoing political oversight. They cannot settle for a one-time
change in the Fed's mandate substituting a rigid rule for Fed
discretion because such discretion is needed to give sensible
effect to any set of priorities. Instead, these critics aim to rein
in the Fed each time it uses its discretion in ways the critics
dislike. The critics want political actors to be able to require
the Fed to make course adjustments that the Fed, in its discre-
tion, would not otherwise make. In short, although not on its
face a challenge to Fed independence, the claim that the Fed
pursues the wrong priorities amounts in practice to a challenge
to such independence.
There are also those who criticize the Fed for failing to
adopt a rule-based monetary policy regime. In monetary the-
ory, this is known as the "rules versus discretion" debate.1 20
One type of rule would tie the value of money to the supply of a
commodity or set of commodities, the most famous version of
which is the gold standard. But other rules are possible as
well. For example, some economists have long called on the
Fed to increase the money supply by a fixed percentage each
year, with the rate determined by a simple equation.121 The
120 See, e.g., William Van Lear, A Review of the Rules Versus Discretion Debate
in Monetary Policy, 26 E. ECON. J. 29, 29-39 (2000) (providing an overview of the
debate).
121 The "quantity equation," usually written MV = PQ, when converted to an-
nual rates of growth, connects the desired growth rate of the money supply (M) to
the growth in the rate at which money is used in transactions (the "velocity" of
money, VJ, the rate of growth of the price level (P), and the rate of growth of real
GDP (Q). See Equation of Exchange (MV=PQ) / Quantity Theory of Money, EcoN-
MENTOR, http://www.econmentor.com/college-macro/associated-macroeconom
ic-topics/money/equation-of-exchange-mv=PQ--quantity-theory-of-money/text/
362.html [https://perma.cc/ECM2-TXE]. The last three variables are assumed
to grow at constant rates, making it possible simply to mandate that the Fed
increase M at the rate necessary to achieve stable prices and economic growth.
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idea is to prevent the Fed from exercising discretion in setting
monetary policy because the consequences of the Fed's over-
reacting or underreacting are supposedly worse than not acting
at all.
There would thus appear to be two separate questions
here. First, should monetary policy be operated under a fixed
set of mechanical rules, or instead should the conduct of mone-
tary policy be deliberately arranged to require ongoing human
judgment in responding to emerging evidence? Second, if
human judgment is going to be part of the setting of monetary
policy, should that human judgment be exercised by politically
insulated human beings or by more directly politically account-
able human beings?
In one sense, then, our enterprise in this Article would
seem to require us simply to assume that the answer to the
first question is "discretion, not rules," and then to answer the
second question by saying that such discretion should be exer-
cised by an independent Fed. Yet that is not in fact our ap-
proach. We argue that the first question presents a false
choice. Even if one thinks that monetary policy should be
carried out according to rigid rules, there must be a human
element in determining the content of those rules in the first
place, including rules about whether and how the rules can be
changed. Those rules can be set legislatively (that is, by politi-
cians directly), by executive agencies (whose personnel are ap-
pointed and removable by politicians), or by an independent
agency (whose staff are sheltered from direct political control).
Our argument, that politically independent economic special-
ists should set monetary policy, thus subsumes the "rules ver-
sus discretion" question because we recognize that that
debate-although important on its own terms, as a matter of
determining the Fed's actions on an ongoing basis-falsely
imagines that human judgment can be removed from the es-
tablishment and maintenance over time of a monetary system.
For example, if Congress decided (quite unwisely, in our
view) to put the U.S. back on a gold standard, it might also
decide that the only way to change the dollars-to-gold ratio in
the future would be by enacting new legislation; in other words,
the gold-standard legislation itself would set the ratio. Or,
Congress could decide (much more wisely, at least given its
See id. This theory has long been contested, and the empirical evidence shows
that the relevant variables change over time at varying and unpredictable rates.
See IRVING FISHER, THE PURCHASING POWER OF MONEY: ITS DETERMINATION AND REIA-
TION TO CREDIT, INTEREST AND CRISES 149-84 (1911).
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initial bad decision to adopt a gold standard) to set rules that
anticipate when and by whom the ratio could be altered or even
that the gold standard could be abandoned entirely, for exam-
ple, during a crisis like 2008. Our argument here is that, no
matter what the background regime might be, there is virtually
no rules-based regime that removes the human ability (and
responsibility) to set the rules and to alter the rules. 1 2 2 The
best institutional design, in our view, would have politically
independent human beings making judgments about when
and how to change the rules.
We have seen in this Part that some of the criticisms that
have recently been leveled at the Fed do not challenge the Fed's
independence in the area where conventional wisdom holds
that it needs to be independent of day-to-day political influ-
ence: in the making and implementation of monetary policy.
Yet some such criticisms do pose a challenge in just that area.
We think that many of these criticisms are mistaken as a sub-
stantive policy matter, but others will draw different conclu-
sions. If one is persuaded that Fed independence stands as an
obstacle to substantively optimal policy, one will need a very
strong reason for valuing Fed independence more highly than
the substantive policy. Thus, we turn next to asking whether
there is a strong justification for Fed independence.
III
How THE FED SAVED THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MIGHT
HAVE TO Do So AGAIN
The Federal Reserve's role as an independent central bank
necessarily puts it in a unique position in the U.S. economic
and political system. When a crisis emerges, the Fed's combi-
nation of expertise and political insulation gives it the ability to
respond quickly and with appropriately calibrated strength to
prevent matters from getting truly out of hand, and to guide the
financial markets and the economy back toward stability. The
122 The only exception that occurs to us would be an unamendable constitu-
tional provision setting forth a mechanical rule. Although the initial adoption of
such a rule would require the exercise of judgment, its subsequent operation
would be, in principle at least, automatic. We dismiss this possibility because
even those constitutions that purport to permanently entrench certain features,
such as Article 79(3) of the German Basic Law, do not entrench institutional
arrangements regarding monetary policy. See GRUNDGESETZ [GGI [BASIC LAw], art.




Fed's recent performance in preventing a complete global eco-
nomic meltdown is one of the under-appreciated stories of our
time.
Moreover, the Fed's necessary emergency actions might be
needed again in the not-too-distant future, in a situation that
would make it clear that the Fed's vaunted independence is
essential to solving and preventing self-inflicted damage. Per-
versely, however, if the Fed's actions actually do frustrate the
desires of the politicians who might precipitate such a crisis,
the Fed could be required to sign its own political death war-
rant in order to rescue the economy. Fortunately, there is a
way to save the Fed from having to make such a fateful choice,
as we discuss below.
A. The Fed, the Existential Crisis of 2008-09, and the
Aftermath
Like most institutions of government, the Federal Reserve
is designed to operate normally during normal times. 1 2 3 Its
day-to-day activities certainly include vigilantly scanning the
horizon for storms, but most of its resources are quite sensibly
devoted to making sure that the financial system runs
smoothly even when no crises are imminent. Because some
serious problems can arise not only from unexpected outside
forces (such as a spike in a vital commodity such as oil due to a
war in the Middle East, or a stock market crisis in a major
foreign trading partner like China) but also from imbalances
within the U.S. financial system, the Fed must actively ensure
that the financial system is not developing problems that could
suddenly metastasize into full-blown crises. Its regulatory role,
therefore, is in part designed to guarantee that normal day-to-
day operations are held within safe boundaries.
As we noted in our Introduction,1 24 one might reasonably
fault the Fed for failing to carry out its oversight duties of the
financial system during the years leading up to the 2008 global
financial crisis. Especially in a low-interest rate environment-
which was a sensible policy posture during that time period,
given the continued weakness of the economy throughout
George W. Bush's presidency-the Fed, at least with the benefit
of 20/20 hindsight, should have been much more vigilant
123 Some agencies are designed specifically to deal with unpredictable crises,
such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 6 U.S.C. § 313 (2012).
Even those agencies have ongoing operations and management imperatives that
they pursue between crises.
124 See supra text accompanying note 18.
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about the emergence of problems that were perhaps inevitable
in an economy where housing prices were rising very rapidly.
As we described in Part I, the fundamental danger in any
financial system is that the banks could experience flash crises
known as "runs," which can destroy not just individual banks
but, through financial contagion effects, also spread to other-
wise healthy financial institutions.1 2 5 Although the Fed, in its
early years, failed its first big test of being the "lender of last
resort" at the onset of the Great Depression in 1929 (and con-
tinuing for years thereafter), the Fed learned its lesson and
subsequently became the lynchpin of a system that has pro-
tected the U.S. financial system from further such crises.126
The period between the end of the Great Depression and 2008
was not, obviously, one of uninterrupted prosperity,1 2 7 but it
was a period notable for a significant decrease in the frequency
and severity of financial and economic crises, compared to the
decades before the Great Depression.
With hindsight, we now know that the 2000s boom in
housing was enabled by the emergence of a so-called "shadow
125 For a particularly vivid depiction of a bank run, see IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE
(Liberty Films (II) 1946). There, the depositors in a financial institution learn that
there is insufficient cash on hand for the institution to pay daily withdrawals. At
that point, all of the depositors demand to be refunded their money immediately,
which of course is not possible. A short-term cash flow problem thus threatens to
shutter a fundamentally healthy financial institution. The film does not depict
the effect that this run would have on other institutions, when word spread that
depositors at this particular institution had not been paid their money. This
fictionalized account repeatedly played out in real life, to disastrous effect,
through the early years of the Great Depression.
126 Congress played a role as well, instituting important protections such as
deposit insurance, along with other securities regulation and similar innovations.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2012). Congress repealed one of the most important pro-
tections against systemic collapse-the formal separation of commercial banks
and investment banks-several decades later. Arguably, this later change and
other deregulatory actions by Congress and relevant agencies set the stage for the
2008 crisis. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 (Banking Act of 1933), ch. 89, §§ 16,
20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.), repealed in part by The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). Therefore, although we partly fault the Fed for failing
to prevent the buildup of the financial imbalances that led to that crisis, we
recognize that the Fed was perhaps only at fault for failing to respond adequately
to a disaster that was set in motion by the unwise decisions of political actors.
127 This long period of rising national income has, unfortunately, also been a
period of rising inequality. Although distributive justice is generally not within
the Fed's policy goals, critics on the political left have long faulted the Fed for
engaging in policies that enrich financial market players while paying insufficient
attention to monetary policy's effects on the middle class and poor. See supra text
accompanying notes 116-117.
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banking" sector.1 28 That is, although the Fed and other rele-
vant regulators were able to prevent the banks from experienc-
ing the types of runs that nearly destroyed the economy in the
1930s, investment banks like Lehman Brothers and a growing
number of hedge funds were engaging in bank-like activities
that created a global market in payment streams from aggre-
gated mortgage debt, which in turn led to irresponsible lending.
Whereas in the earlier period, a conventional local mortgage
lender would typically issue a thirty-year mortgage and then
patiently collect monthly payments for the life of the loan, by
the dawn of the new millennium, financial "engineers" had fig-
ured out how to provide all kinds of variations on traditional
mortgages, and to offer them through financial institutions
that operated nationwide, with the payment streams sold to
investors worldwide.
Even traditional mortgages were turned into new catego-
ries of investment securities that were then traded on global-
ized markets, with the buyers of those securities dependent on
the representations of credit rating agencies that the underly-
ing mortgages were safe and that the risk of default was com-
puted accurately. 129 As a further hedge against risk, financial
institutions began to purchase insurance policies known as
credit default swaps, which essentially were guarantees by
other financial institutions that the holders of such swaps
would be made whole if any securities unexpectedly failed to
pay off.
This shadow-banking sector was, of course, just as inter-
connected as traditional banks have always been.13 0 In fact,
the connections were more complex, and the aggregate dollar
128 Details of the now-familiar story in the subsequent paragraphs can be
found in many places. See, e.g., Daniel Sanches, Shadow Banking and the Crisis
of2007-08, PHIIA. FED Bus. REv., Apr.-June 2014, at 7, 7-14 https://philadelphia
fed.org/research... /brq214_shadowbanking.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3NK-
2VUNI ("One lesson of the financial crisis is that [the shadow banking system is]
as vulnerable to panics as traditional banks because they are subject to similar
risks."); Zoltan Pozsar, The Rise and Fall of the Shadow Banking System, MooDY's
ECONOMY (July 2008), https://www.economy.com/sbs [https://perma.cc/Y7S8-
LEMJ] (describing the emergence of the shadow banking system as "the heart" of
the financial crisis); Alan Moreira & Alexi Savov, The Macroeconomics of Shadow
Banking 1-4 (Yale Univ., Faculty Paper, 2016), http://faculty.som.yale.edu/
alanmorelra/Papers/ShadowMacro.pdf [https://perma.cc/C89T-KS9F (explain-
ing how shadow banking "builds financial and economic fragility" and "sets up
slow recoveries"). For a popular account, see generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG
SHORT (2010) (detailing the creation of the credit default swap market and the
individuals who predicted that market's collapse and the ensuing financial crisis).
129 See supra note 128.
130 See supra note 128.
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amounts were in the trillions. These large portfolios were none-
theless deemed safe because analysts assessed the risk of de-
fault for any particular security as a statistically independent
probability, isolated from the possibility of financial contagion.
Or, to put it more simply, the financial engineers believed that
all of the securities that they were creating were safe because if
one security failed, all of the other securities would still be
there. But it was only a matter of time before some securities
would fail, and if the failure was significant enough, the inter-
connections between the various financial securities could
start to unravel the system. 131
Again, one can reasonably argue that the Fed should have
seen these problems while they were emerging. Even though
there is no obvious way to know when we have crossed over
from a simple bull market to a bubble, the Fed might well have
been in a position to tighten its regulations regarding these
formerly unseen financial institutions. Of course, as we em-
phasize throughout this Article, the Fed does not act in a politi-
cal vacuum, and there was a great deal of political pressure
preventing the Fed and other agencies from tamping down
these temporarily profitable opportunities. There was money to
be made, and the political branches sided with those whose
fortunes were dependent on a continued hands-off attitude by
the Fed and other regulators.
At worst, then, the Fed can be blamed for being unwilling
to risk its policy independence by taking actions that could
have raised the ire of Congress and the Bush administration.
Perhaps the Fed, like nearly everyone else at the time, also
underestimated the risks.1 32 What is clear, however, is that
the Fed not only stepped forward when the crisis erupted and
quite literally saved the economy from collapse, but it was the
only institution that could have done so, both practically and
politically.
Once the financial crisis was set in motion by the collapse
of Lehman Brothers and other shocking events, the ensuing
financial panic wiped out trillions of dollars of notional value in
the markets. One of the largest insurers of financial products,
AIG, discovered that its business model was based on the
131 See supra note 128.
132 But not quite everyone. See LEWIS, supra note 128, at 1-25.
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flawed idea that not everything could go bad at the same time.
But it could, and it did. 133
In late 2008, there was serious question whether matters
had already gotten so far out of hand that a second Great
Depression was inevitable. As we noted in our Introduction,
the political branches stepped forward with a combination of
bailouts that prominently included the creation of the Troub-
led-Assets Relief Program (TARP). TARP, however, was worth
only about $700 billion, which was dwarfed by the trillions of
dollars in paper wealth that were hanging in the balance. And
because TARP alone created a political rebellion on the left of
the Democratic Party and the right of the Republican Party, the
political response was doomed to be inadequate.1 34
In that environment, the Fed was clearly the only institu-
tion that could be counted on to act in the interests of saving
the system, rather than worrying about misplaced accusations
of "bailing out losers."13 5 Moreover, the trillions of dollars nec-
essary to stop the contagion from spreading further simply did
not exist. Only the Fed, with its unique ability to create new
money when necessary, could do what was needed. As we
discussed in Part 11,136 there are prima facie plausible criti-
cisms of the Fed for exceeding its statutory authority in pursuit
of these policies, but such technical criticisms ultimately ig-
nore the very nature of the Fed's role as lender of last resort.
Moreover, the Fed also knew that it possessed the ability to
destroy money, which it could do if it found that the money that
it had created threatened to create inflation. As it turned out,
however, the new money had its desired effect with none of the
bad possible side effects. Banks and other financial institu-
tions were given sufficient funds to make it unnecessary to
133 See Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Behind AIG's Fall, Risk Models Failed to
Pass Real-World Test, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 31, 2008 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB122538449722784635 [https://perma.cc/2NTZ-RLIA].
134 The unpopularity of TARP on the populist right was a key element in the
emergence of what is now known as the Tea Party movement. Bob Bennett, a
conservative Republican U.S. Senator from Utah, voted to pass TARP. He then
lost his party's nominating caucus in 2010, ending his political career. Tea Party
activists at the convention reportedly chanted derisively, "TARPI TARPI TARP" to
cheer Bennett's defeat. See Amy Gardner, Tea Party Wins Victory in Utah as
Incumbent GOP Senator Loses Bid for Nomination, WASH. PosT (May 9, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/08/AR20
10050803430.html lhttps://perma.cc/R8S7-75A6].
135 If any institution is aware of the dangers of moral hazard, it is certainly the
Fed because its regulatory mandate so clearly aims at discouraging financial
arrangements that lead to increasingly risky behavior. Even so, the Fed's role also
makes it aware that other factors must be balanced against such concerns.
136 See supra text accompanying notes 74-87.
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continue to sell off their financial holdings, stopping the conta-
gion as other asset holders were not forced to sell their assets
at fire sale prices. To the extent that the Fed's injection of
liquidity was inadequate, it was largely because financial insti-
tutions sat on the money the Fed created, acting with new-
found extreme caution to protect their own balance sheets from
even the hint of risk. Rather than using the new money to
restore prosperity, therefore, the bailed-out financial institu-
tions simply held onto safe assets. The Fed had stopped the
crisis, but the hope that the private sector would quickly re-
sume normal activity went unfulfilled.' 3 7
In addition to pouring new money into the financial mar-
kets to contain the disaster that inadequate regulation had
enabled, the Fed also deployed its key monetary policy tool to
fight the Great Recession. Acting quickly, the Fed lowered its
target interest rate in steps, setting a zero percent target begin-
ning on December 16, 2008.138 The economy remained weak,
and continuing to reduce interest rates is the standard re-
sponse to a weakened economy. However, interest rates can-
not be reduced below zero because (other than situations in
which people will actually pay a financial institution to hold
their money, in what amounts to purchasing a virtual vault)
there is no reason to deposit money rather than hold onto it if
the payoff is zero either way.1 3 9 Certainly, no one would give an
institution money in exchange for the promise that the institu-
tion will return less money in the future. This is commonly
known as the "zero lower bound."14 0
Cutting its target interest rate to zero, therefore, was the
most that the Fed could do, using its standard approach to
137 See Ben Protess & Eric Dash, Many Banks Are Clinging to Billions ofBailout
Money, N.Y. TIMEs DEALBOOK (Mar. 18, 2011, 9:31 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2011/03/18/many-banks-are-clinging-to-billions-in-ballout-money/?_r=O
[https://perma.cc/LGG9-BJ5F].
138 See Joseph Lawler, Fed's Zero Interest-Rate Policy Stretches into Seventh
Year, WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 28, 2015, 2:34 PM), http://www.washingtonexamin
er.com/feds-zero-interest-rate-policy-stretches-into-seventh-year/article/25
75117 [https://perma.cc/M5LV-48XR]; See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents
/press/monetary/20081216b.htm [https://perma.cc/L4ZC-MEJ4].
139 See supra note 110.
140 See R.A., The Zero Lower Bound in Our Minds, ECONOMIST (Jan. 7, 2012,
7:56 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/01/monetary-
policy ihttps://perma.cc/9MH4-8XEVI; see also Paul Krugman, How Negative
Can Rates Go?, N.Y. TIMES: THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (Mar. 3, 2015, 12:55 PM),
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/how-negative-can-rates-go/
[https://perma.cc/6PRV-ZAJ9) (arguing that the lower bound is not precisely 0.0
percent for all borrowing, but the idea is the same).
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setting monetary policy. The hope was that the economy would
quickly recover, and that the Fed could then move interest
rates into a range within which it would again be possible to
move rates up and down in anticipation of future fluctuations
in the economy. Instead, because the economy has remained
so disappointingly weak for so long, 1 4 as of autumn 2016, the
Fed has only raised interest rates once since the onset of the
Great Recession (from zero to 0.25 percent 42 in December
2015), although it has hinted at plans for further increases in
the not-too-distant future.14 3
As we argue in Part IV, the main reason that the Fed has
not been able to resume its historical role of prudently adjust-
ing interest rates to smooth economic fluctuations is that the
president and Congress have agreed to enact perversely con-
tractionary policies that have slowed the economy's recovery.
Moreover, these misguided fiscal policies have all but forced
the Fed to do what it can to prevent the economy from sliding
back into recession (and another potential financial crisis).
The various waves of quantitative easing have seen the Fed
redirect its asset purchases in a way that would provide some
forward movement to the economy. Even those economists
141 Although the unemployment rate has recently fallen to levels that in the
past would have suggested that the economy had reached full employment, other
indicators that normally accompany a strengthening economy-in particular, ro-
bust wage increases and an increase in the growth rate of gross domestic prod-
uct-have persistently failed to materialize. In the period since the official end of
the Great Recession, the economy has stalled each time that it has shown some
promise of accelerating. See Josh Bivens, Andrew Fieldhouse & Heidi Shierholz,
From Free-Fall to Stagnation 1-3 (Econ. Pol'y Inst., Briefing Paper No. 355, Feb.
14, 2013), http://www.epi.org/ffles/2013/bp355-five-years-after-start-of-great-
recession.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJ7D-HSQ9]; Jana Kasperkevic, US Economy
Adds 173,000 Jobs as Unemployment Rate Drops to 5.1%, GUARDIAN (Sept. 4,
2015, 8:42 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/sep/04/us-econ
omy-jobs-report-unemployment-drops-interest-rate [https://perma.cc/263Q-
HV5X]; see also Ben Wolfgang, Low Unemployment Rate Obscures Decline in
Americans Seeking Work, WASH. TIMES (July 7, 2015), http://www.washington
times.com/news/2015/jul/7/unemployment-rate-drop-obscures-troubling-de
cline-/?page=all [https://perma.cc/WHA2-KF86] (describing declining labor force
participation rates). Therefore, the current low unemployment rate appears to be
a false indicator (in part because so many people have dropped out of the labor
force and not yet returned, which reduces the measured unemployment rate).
142 See Jeff Cox, Fed Raises Rates by 25 Basis Points, First Since 2006, CNBC
(Dec. 16, 2015, 2:41 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/16/fed-raises-rates-
for-first-time-since-2006.html [https://perma.cc/L9GP-KCUN].
143 See Binyamin Appelbaum, A January Pause, but Fed Affirms Plan for Grad-
ual Rate Increases, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
01/28/business/economy/fed-interest-rates.html [https://perma.cc/U3EH-
E5PHI. We view even these anticipated modest rate increases as a bad idea at this
point, given the failure of the economy's superficial strength to benefit most work-
ers. See supra note 141.
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who support the Fed in these efforts concede that the positive
impacts have been modest, but something is still better than
nothing.1 44
Disputes about the Fed's various policy choices aside, how-
ever, the important point here is that the Fed was the only
institution in 2008 and 2009 that had the ability to create
money-to be what central banks need to be, which is the
lender of last resort. As it happened, a lot of money needed to
be created, given the severity of the immediate crisis. And the
Fed, even knowing that it is constantly in danger of running
afoul of the predispositions of powerful politicians, stepped up
and prevented the financial crisis from becoming a global
depression.
We hope that the Fed will never need to take this kind of
action again. At the very least, we ought to be able to count on
our politicians not to create the threat of a crisis that only the
Fed can prevent. As we shall see in subparts B and C, however,
there is a very real possibility that the Fed will be required to
prevent a completely avoidable (and entirely politically in-
spired) train wreck.
B. The Debt Ceiling and the President's Options During a
Standoff
A longstanding statute known as the "debt ceiling" pur-
ports to prevent the level of federal debt from rising above a
specific dollar figure, specified in the statute.1 45 Prior to 2011,
this law was essentially a meaningless bit of feel-good legisla-
tion with no practical import. Although there had been occa-
sions in previous decades in which the party in opposition to
the then-sitting president would use the occasion of a required
increase in the debt ceiling to offer patriotic speeches about the
supposed irresponsibility of allowing the national debt to con-
tinue to increase, pretty much everyone knew that such grand-
standing was meaningless political theater.
The problem was not necessarily that these politicians
were insincere in their statements that they did not want the
debt to rise.146 Indeed, as we discuss in Part IV below, one of
144 See Agustino Fontevecchia, FOMC: Fed Blames Congress and Obama for
Slow Economy, Pledges Continued QE, FORBES (May 1, 2013, 2:23 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2013/05/01/fomc-fed-blames-congress-
and-obamas-sequestration-for-slow-economy/ [https://perma.c/5UZ4-UEW4].
145 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2012).
146 Still, it is difficult not to suspect that insincerity and cynicism were, and
are, in ample supply in fiscal policy debates. Many of the politicians who com-
plain the loudest about the national debt refuse to vote to increase taxes at all,
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the major barriers to sensible policy in the current environ-
ment is the belief among so many politicians that budgetary
austerity somehow will heal the economy's ills. The larger
problem, then, is not that there are politicians who refuse to
control the national debt, but that there are so few politicians
who know (or are willing to admit) a point so basic that it
underlay Hamilton's 1790 Report on the Public Credit, which
in turn laid the foundation for America's eventual emergence as
the world's largest economy-that some level of government
debt is a virtue, not a vice, so that it would be an affirmatively
bad idea to pay the federal government's debt down to any-
where near zero. 147
In that sense, then, the status quo ante was an essentially
harmless matter of political theater.14 8 Everyone knew that the
already-passed spending and taxing laws required additional
borrowing, and the occasional necessity to increase the dollar
limit in the debt ceiling statute afforded everyone the opportu-
nity to blame everyone else for our supposedly irresponsible
fiscal policies. After a few days of speechmaking, the reality
would return that the spending and taxing laws actually had to
be executed as written, which necessarily meant updating the
debt ceiling statute.
After the 2010 midterm elections, however, the new Repub-
lican majority in the House of Representatives seized upon a
novel political strategy. Rather than simply conceding that the
debt ceiling's level would need to be adjusted in light of con-
gressional enactments, the new view was that the president
could be accused of "wanting to increase the debt ceiling." And
because a person who wants something must necessarily pay
for it, the "price" of a debt ceiling increase would be for the
president to agree to change one or more laws in ways that the
House majority found appealing, but which they had not been
able to achieve through normal legislative means. Although
there was nothing logically limiting the Republicans' demands
and the spending cuts that they are willing to countenance are too small to make
a serious difference. Opposing borrowing, apparently, means wishing that it were
possible to get something for nothing. Although we are pleased that these politi-
cians have not succeeded in their stated goal of cutting spending sufficiently to
reduce the national debt, we note the logical inconsistency of their positions.
147 See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, First Report on the Further Provision Necessary for
Establishing Public Credit, in 7 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 225-35 (Harold
C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1963); see also Neil H. Buchanan, Why We
Should Never Pay Down the National Debt, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. 683, 688-97
(2012) (arguing that many concerns about the national debt are misguided and
explaining the advantages of having some government debt).
148 See Buchanan, supra note 147, at 686.
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to the realm of fiscal policy-they could, after all, have refused
to increase the debt ceiling unless the president agreed to re-
peal environmental laws, or to support abortion restrictions, or
anything else that the president would not otherwise support-
in the summer of 2011, the Republican leadership in the House
announced that their party would not increase the debt ceiling
without further cuts in federal spending, even though the
House had only weeks before passed a continuing resolution
that included spending cuts, and even though the bill that they
passed would, as a matter of simple arithmetic, still require the
debt ceiling to be increased. 149
The White House responded to these demands by agreeing
to negotiate with House leaders, narrowly averting a first-ever
default on U.S. obligations in early August 2011 only by agree-
ing to a series of actions that ended in large, new cuts in cur-
rent and future spending.so In particular, after the failure of a
bipartisan "super-committee" to agree on precisely targeted
measures, the now-infamous "sequester" went into effect, re-
sulting in automatic and indiscriminate cuts in domestic and
military spending1 5 1 that continue to this day to limit the path
of federal spending, even after legislation enacted in 2013 and
2015 to ease the sequester caps somewhat. 152
Unsurprisingly, Republicans in Congress viewed their vic-
tory in the summer of 2011 as a template for the future. Sena-
tor Mitch McConnell, then the minority leader in the Senate,
announced that the debt ceiling would henceforth be a bar-
gaining chip, and that President Obama should expect to have
to give something up if he wanted Congress to give him the
authority to borrow more money. Because the 2011 agreement
had increased the debt ceiling only to a level that would be
sufficient for a little more than two years, given the (decreasing,
149 See Lori Montgomery et al., Origins of the Debt Showdown, WASH. POST
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152 See James Gao, Debt Ceiling Resolved, but Long-Term Budget Outlook is
Bleak, U. CHI.: THE GATE (Nov. 30, 2015), http://uchicagogate.com/2015/11/30/
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perma.cc/UK8R-F3RT; see also David M. Herszenhom, Congress Strikes a





but still positive) annual budget deficit, the next debt ceiling
political standoff was baked into that legislation. 5 3
Before that next drop-dead date was reached, the authors
of this Article wrote a series of articles in which we argued that
the president would be justified in announcing that the debt
ceiling statute is unconstitutional, and that he would therefore
refuse to allow the debt ceiling to prevent him from carrying out
his duties under the spending and revenue laws.15 4 We coined
the term "trilemma" to describe the president's impossible posi-
tion, should Congress refuse to increase the debt ceiling. If
federal debt reached the statutory ceiling at any given time,
and the difference between legislated expenditures and tax rev-
enues was, say, $50 billion, then the president would be re-
quired either to: (1) collect $50 billion more in taxes than
Congress had (via the Internal Revenue Code) ordered him to
collect; (2) spend $50 billion less than Congress had (via the
appropriations laws) ordered him to spend; or (3) borrow $50
billion more than Congress had (via the debt ceiling statute)
authorized him to borrow.
Because each prong of the trilenima would require the
president to usurp an enumerated power of Congress, any path
that the president chose would violate the Constitution. We
argued, however, that it was possible to rank the three uncon-
stitutional choices, and we concluded that the president would
do the least constitutional damage by honoring Congress's
commands regarding spending and taxing, which he could only
do by setting aside Congress's contradictory command regard-
ing debt. If Congress disagreed with the president's choice to
borrow the necessary amount of money to avoid a default on
the government's obligations, it retained the power to change
future spending and tax levels to achieve the level of debt that it
desired.
The conventional wisdom in policy circles holds that faced
with a shortfall caused by reaching the debt ceiling limit, the
president ought to unilaterally withhold payment on spending
obligations as they come due, but we argued (and still contend)
that this conventional wisdom is wrong. For the president to
arrogate to him- or herself the power to change Congress's
spending priorities-honoring some of Congress's expressed
153 See Jennifer Depaul & Eric Pianin, McConnell Turns Debt Ceiling into a
Political Football FISCAL TIMEs (July 12, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/
Articles/2011/07/12/McConnell-Turns-Debt-Celling-Into-a-Political-Football
[https://perma.cc/F3F6-7DDPI.
154 See supra note 8.
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wishes while frustrating others-would undo so much of the
legislative branch's negotiated compromises that the constitu-
tional structure cannot permit it. As now-Chief Justice John
Roberts once wrote: "Separation of powers is a zero-sum game.
If one branch unconstitutionally aggrandizes itself, it is at the
expense of one of the other branches."1 55 The degree of execu-
tive aggrandizement that would follow from a president's deci-
sion to reset Congress's spending priorities is simply too great,
compared to the alternatives. The president should not be al-
lowed or expected to use the debt ceiling statute as a reason to
ignore Congress's hard-fought budgetary compromises, and in-
stead to decide which bills to pay and which to ignore or delay.
Notwithstanding our analysis, the Obama White House en-
dorsed the conventional wisdom that the president would have
no choice but to usurp Congress's spending power by refusing
to make required payments to the government's obligees, if
Congress ever fails to make a timely adjustment in the debt
ceiling.15 6 This decision might well have been based on savvy
political strategizing. For example, the White House might
have feared that the president could be accused of "wanting to
borrow money," or that he has "blown through the debt ceil-
ing," or similar baseless-but potentially potent-political at-
tacks. Whatever the political reasons, however, there is no
evidence that the Obama Administration was ever seriously
contemplating following our advice.
President Obama did, however, change his political strat-
egy after losing his first debt ceiling battle, in the summer of
2011. Rather than accepting the idea that an increase in the
debt ceiling was a desirable goal in itself, for which he had to
pay a political price, he pointed out (correctly) that the debt
ceiling must be increased simply in order to prevent the federal
government from defaulting on obligations to which it was al-
ready legally committed. To be able to pay our bills, the presi-
dent took the position that the debt ceiling was non-
negotiable.1 5 7 Neither side wanted to increase the debt ceiling,
as a matter of policy commitments, but both sides were respon-
155 John G. Roberts, Jr., Article 1II Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DuKE L.J.
1219, 1230 (1993).
156 See Buchanan & Dorf, Nullfyling the Debt Ceiling Threat, supra note 8, at
242-48 (2012).
157 See, e.g., Neil Irwin, Does Raising the Debt Ceiling Increase the Debt?,
WASH. PosT: WONKBLOG (Oct. 8, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2013/10/08/does-raising-the-debt-ceiling-increase-the-debt/
[https://perma.cc/T5FX-AKF7] (quoting President Obama and drawing an anal-
ogy to personal finance).
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sible for increasing it to the level that would be required to
allow the nation's obligations to be met. The president thus
drew a line in the sand, saying that he would accept only a
"clean" debt ceiling increase, and that he would not negotiate
over unrelated issues in order to adjust the nominal limit in the
debt ceiling statute.15 8
As far as it went, the president's revised approach was
clearly correct. The debt ceiling statute is simply not relevant
to determining how much debt the government issues. Mem-
bers of Congress who (wrongly, in our view) think that the
deficit should be zero, or who even believe that the debt should
be paid down (which would require annual surpluses, probably
for decades to come) have the legislative means necessary to
make that happen through the normal budgetary process. The
debt ceiling is thus not about changing the amount of debt, but
about making it impossible to finance the debt that Congress
has already put in place.
As we argued in our most recent article, once there are
spending and taxing laws in place that imply the need for defi-
cit financing, the government will have to take on that new debt
by issuing formal Treasury securities, or it will instead borrow
the money without calling it debt by telling its obligees that
they must wait to be paid. Either way, once the spending and
taxing laws have been passed, the die is cast, and the debt will
rise above the level specified in the debt ceiling statute,
whether Republicans in Congress admit it or not. The only way
around this conclusion, we noted, would be for the president to
take the radical (and unconstitutional, even on the narrowest
reading of the relevant provisions) step of repudiating its obli-
gations outright.15 9
In that sense, then, the president was correct to say that
Congress has no choice under the Constitution but to increase
the debt ceiling when appropriate (or, even better, to repeal the
debt ceiling statute entirely), and to stop trying to use that law
as a political battering ram.
In addition, as a matter of political strategy, one could
understand why the president would loudly announce his new
commitment not to sign a bill raising the debt ceiling if it in-
158 See Jim Acosta et al., Obama Says He'd Talk on GOP's Terms-If They
Raise Debt Ceiling, Fund Government, CNN (Oct. 9, 2013, 6:22 AM), http://
www.cnn.com/2013/10/08/politics/shutdown-showdown/ [https://perma.cc/
HQ3P-SFSN] (quoting President Obama refusing to accede to Republicans' "ran-
som" demands in exchange for paying the government's bills).
159 See Buchanan & Dorf, Borrowing by Any Other Name, supra note 8, at
28-33.
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cludes any other provisions. As in the deadly game of
"chicken," such a "stare-down strategy," as we call it, can only
work if the other side knows in advance that the president is
fully committed to staying the course. The congressional
Republicans' only choice at that point is to test the president's
level of commitment. As it happens, President Obama's oppo-
nents did indeed blink each time that a debt ceiling increase
was required in the post-2011 era, agreeing each time to in-
crease the debt ceiling (or, in some cases, to "suspend" the debt
ceiling temporarily, and then reset the limit to a higher level
when the ceiling is later reinstated) and thus avoid a default on
the government's obligations. In that sense, President Obama
"won" the post-2011 debt ceiling standoffs. However, there is
no guarantee that his successor will prevail in future standoffs,
the first of which could occur in early 2017, when the debt
ceiling will next need to be raised.16 0 Ominously, in February
2016, House Republicans released a report that strongly sug-
gests that they continue to think that failure to raise the debt
ceiling would impose no special hardship-and certainly no
constitutional crisis-for the executive branch: they apparently
regard the stare-down strategy as a bluff that they are now
prepared to call.1 6 1
Thus, there was and continues to be an enormous danger
inherent in the stare-down strategy. Imagine that the next
president secretly agrees with our analysis, and thus that he or
she would be willing-if Congress ultimately refuses to blink
during a future stare-down-to issue new debt in order to
honor Congress's dictates regarding spending and taxing. At
what point would the president be able to announce that he or
she is going to issue new debt? Announcing his or her fallback
strategy before the very last second would allow opponents in
Congress to blame him or her in exactly the way that the presi-
dent would hope not to be blamed, which would supposedly
weaken him or her in the competition for public approval (and
160 See Joseph Lawler, Deal Would Suspend Debt Ceiling Until After 2017 Inau-
guration, WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 27, 2015, 9:41 AM), http://www.washingtonexam
iner.com/deal-would-suspend-debt-ceiling-until-after-2017-inauguration/arti
cle/2574984 [https://perma.cc/2HDN-DRHF].
161 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTI-
GATIONS, 114TH CONG., STAFF REPORT: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S DEBT CEILING
SUBTERFUGE: SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS REVEAL TREASURY MISLED PUBLIC IN ATTEMPT TO
"MAXIMIZE PRESSURE ON CONGRESS" 16-22 (Feb. 1, 2016), http://financialservices.
house.gov/uploadedfiles/debt_ceiling-repor-tfinal0 1292015.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MKB7-DQYA]. As the report's title indicates, House Republicans be-
lieve that the Obama Administration had contingent plans to prioritize payments,
and that the stare-down strategy was therefore a bluff.
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of finger pointing). Meanwhile, the stare-down strategy's likeli-
hood of working is at its highest as the clock ticks toward
midnight on the drop-dead date, as congressional opponents
become convinced that the president will refuse to blink.
Yet waiting until the witching hour to announce the issu-
ance of debt-ceiling-violating debt would create serious techni-
cal implementation issues. Normally, the sale of new debt
securities in a standard bond auction (which is the method by
which the federal government borrows money) is announced
weeks in advance, and the process plays out over hours or
days. If the president is strategically committed to waiting un-
til the last possible second, however, he or she would be unable
to authorize the necessary auction in time to prevent a default.
The federal government must pay bills that come due every
day, and if sufficient tax revenues do not come in on that day,
abiding by the debt ceiling would leave the Treasury with no
way to pay the people to whom the government owes money.
On the drop-dead date, bills would come due that could only be
paid by borrowing money, yet the money would not yet have
been borrowed, and it would be logistically impossible to hold a
timely bond auction.
Importantly, when we describe such an event as a "first-
ever" default on the government's obligations, we also mean to
emphasize the gravity of such an unprecedented event. The
U.S. government is considered the safest borrower in the world,
and its reputation for sound finances is based on the fact that
no one has ever been denied payment in full on the date that
the federal government has legally committed to making a pay-
ment. The United States has never said, "sorry, I'll get it to you
in a few days." People and businesses to which the government
owes money count on timely and complete payments, and they
make further commitments on that basis. Missing payments
by even a day is no small matter.
In short, the stakes in a debt ceiling stare-down are incal-
culably high. The federal government's future ability to bor-
row, to enter into contracts, and its very ability to continue to
conduct its affairs in a businesslike fashion would be harmed
by any failure to pay its obligations. That is not to say that
people would henceforth refuse to do business with the govern-
ment, or to lend it money, but just like any other borrower with
a tarnished credit rating, the government would see its future
borrowing costs rise. And the shame of it is that these in-
creased costs to be borne by taxpayers are completely
avoidable.
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Therefore, the danger of a presidential debt ceiling stare-
down strategy is that, if neither side blinks, it would be too late
for the president to adopt a new strategy that would both mini-
mize the constitutional violation and save the nation's
creditworthiness. Fortunately, there is one way out. Unfortu-
nately, relying on the needed deus ex machina would be ex-
traordinarily dangerous.
C. The Dangers of Requiring the Fed to Use Its Full
Powers
As we described above, the Federal Reserve's most impor-
tant duty is to protect the financial markets, and ultimately the
economy. Usually, this means that it must act as the lender of
last resort for financial institutions, as we described in subpart
A, above. Here, however, we see the possibility that the Fed
could be the only lender that could act quickly enough to pre-
vent the debt ceiling from creating a default on some of the
government's obligations.
The Fed's concern in this instance would not only be based
on the idea that the government's future borrowing costs would
rise in the aftermath of a default. The Fed would also be re-
quired to consider the immediate effects on financial markets,
if the United States were to default on any of its legally required
payments between the expiration of the deadline to raise the
debt ceiling and when a sale on the open market of what we
have previously called "Presidential bonds" could be imple-
mented.1 6 2 Even assuming that banks, foreign governments,
and other financial players could eventually be found to buy
the bonds (at an appropriate interest premium reflecting the
cloud on their legality), such purchases would come too late to
avoid default. In the meantime, financial actors, both at home
and abroad, would likely respond to the initial default by taking
protective measures, reducing their exposure and thus cutting
off financial transactions that they would otherwise have been
quite willing to consummate. The risk of financial contagion
would be quite real.
In these circumstances, the Fed might well decide that it
should intervene and immediately buy the new bonds itself. It
162 We previously used the term "Presidential bonds" to emphasize that the
president would need to issue Treasury securities that had not been authorized by
Congress. See Buchanan & Dorf, How to Choose, supra note 8, at 1209. Because
that distinction is not the focus of our analysis here, we will not continue to use
that term. Instead, we simply point out that the president would be required to
issue new bonds, in order to borrow enough money to pay the bills that Con-
gress's previous spending and txdng laws require.
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would need to purchase enough Treasury securities-at mid-
night on the drop-dead date-to allow the federal government
to avoid its first-ever default. For these purposes, the Fed's
independent status is key because it counts as "the public"
when it buys securities from the Treasury.163 Although it
would be buying those securities-that is, lending to the gov-
ernment-with money that it created of its own volition, that
would not be extraordinary, and there is nothing about the
Fed's actions here that would be any different from any other
time that it indirectly increases the money supply (such as its
standard approach to lowering interest rates in the face of a
weak economy). The important point is that the Treasury
would receive the money that it needs to pay all of its obligees,
in full and on time.
Here, of course, the Fed would know that there are no good
choices. The markets would be in some amount of turmoil in
any event, and the Fed's intervention would itself create uncer-
tainty (and no small amount of acrimony). However, because
the Fed is the only institution that would be capable of acting
fast enough and decisively enough to prevent the country from
permanently damaging its credit rating, we would expect the
politically independent Fed to step in to save the day, and to
save the nation from the irresponsible actions of those politi-
cians who would have tried to use an unconstitutional statute
to achieve political ends that they cannot otherwise achieve.
Indeed, we believe that the Fed would be required to buy
the Treasury's new bonds in such a situation, in order to meet
its primary responsibility of protecting the stability of the finan-
cial markets. But even if we are wrong, and the people who are
then in charge of the Fed choose not to intervene, that would
merely mean that they have concluded that the consequences
of a first-ever default are outweighed by other considerations.
Having an institution in place that possesses the political inde-
pendence that would allow it at least to consider following our
advice-rather than being subject to political supervision-is
precisely why we believe that the Fed's independence is so im-
portant in a crisis. It might not always make the tough calls
that other people might want it to make, but it would nonethe-
less be empowered to act on its best judgment.
Note, however, that even if the Fed were to follow our ad-
vice, the debt limit would still have been breached, precisely
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because the Fed counts as "the public" when it lends money to
the government, and it would be holding more Treasury securi-
ties than it held before, increasing the total outstanding debt
above the statutory limit. Nonetheless, as we noted above, that
ship would have sailed when Congress enacted spending and
taxing laws that imply borrowing in excess of the debt ceiling.
The president would still have faced a trilemma and would thus
violate the Constitution's separation of powers by authorizing
the Treasury Department to borrow money from the Fed. As we
have emphasized, however, because this is the least unconstitu-
tional of the president's three options, it is the least bad choice
from a set of only bad options. And at the point where it be-
came clear that the stare-down strategy had resulted in a stale-
mate, the Fed would be the only institution that could allow the
president to come close to meeting his or her constitutional
obligations-and, of course, to minimizing the damage to the
financial system and the economy.
Even so, if the Fed were to follow our advice, it would open
itself up to charges that it had taken sides with the president in
a partisan fight. Even though it would not have made its deci-
sion for political reasons, it would have been forced to choose to
anger either Republicans or Democrats. And this is no small
matter. As we described in Part II, the Fed is already under
constant attack for its activities, with "end the Fed" and "audit
the Fed" efforts now afoot in Congress, as the latest incarna-
tions of the undying distrust of central banks that seems al-
ways to exist just outside the political mainstream.
Here, the action that the Fed would be obligated to take-
buying bonds that have not been authorized by Congress in
order to prevent a federal default-would not only stoke the
fears of "unaccountable" bankers working behind the scenes,
but would also feed into one of the central complaints on the
political right: that the Fed is "enabling the growth of the fed-
eral debt."164 As noted above, the Fed carries out its mandate
to control interest rates and monetary aggregates by buying
and selling Treasury securities. It would be possible for the Fed
instead to buy private financial assets such as corporate stocks
and bonds, but it is difficult to imagine that this would make
the Fed's populist critics feel any better. After all, do they really
164 Binyamin Appelbaum, Challenged on Left and Right, the Fed Faces a Deci-





want the Fed to hold ownership stakes in corporate America or
to be a creditor to American businesses?
In any event, the current reality is that the Fed pushes new
money into the financial system by buying and holding U.S.
Treasury securities. This, in turn, can easily be mischaracter-
ized as "fund[ing] Washington's deficit spending." 165 Even
though the debt ceiling itself has nothing to do with the growth
of the debt, the superficial logic would go something like this:
The Fed already finances the debt. The Democrats want more
debt. The debt ceiling would stop them from issuing it The
president is refusing to negotiate to reduce spending and thus
reduce the debt. The Fed has just proved that it is on the presi-
dent's side by allowing the president to illegally ignore the debt
ceiling.
This possibility suggests that the Fed could have to choose
between following its best judgment and maintaining its politi-
cal independence. The Fed might well agree with us that the
best measure to take, should Congress insist on creating a
trilemma for the president, is to buy the new Treasury securi-
ties that would be issued on the drop-dead date. Yet it would
have to weigh against that policy judgment the possibility that
it could be signing its own death warrant because enraged
opponents could seize on its actions to justify legislation cur-
tailing Fed independence or eliminating the Fed entirely.
In short, the possibility that some members of Congress
will again force a debt-ceiling showdown, combined with the
decision of a future president to use a stare-down strategy,
could result in a crisis that is in some sense tailor-made for an
independent central bank to step in and solve. Yet the result of
such a situation could be either that the Fed does the right
thing at the expense of its own independence, or that it does
the wrong thing to protect that independence. Given the
stakes, and the importance of the Fed in serving as an indepen-
dent but accountable institution, it would be better if the Fed
were never to face such a choice.
We are aware, of course, that in some sense our analysis
here could be used as a roadmap to guarantee the Fed's de-
struction. For someone who is determined to "end the Fed,"
after all, we have described how a deliberately concocted debt-
165 Yian Q. Mui, Conservatives Have Failed to End the Fed, but They're Not
Giving Up Hope, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.washington
post.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2015/09/02/conservatives-have-failed-to-end-
the-fed-but-theyre-not-giving-up-hope/ [https://perma.cc/PVJ8-CCR2] (noting
various criticisms of the Fed, including its supposed funding of deficit spending).
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ceiling crisis could not only serve the purpose of putting the
president in a political bind, but it could also set in motion the
Fed's final demise. We have no doubt that there are those who
would be willing to bet the country's future and roll the dice
(although we dearly hope that there are not enough of those
people actually to make it happen). Even so, we do not view our
role as analyzing an issue but then hiding unwelcome conclu-
sions. Moreover, our analysis here shows even more clearly
why a president's decision to adopt a stare-down strategy,
rather than confronting well in advance of a debt-ceiling stand-
off the reality that the debt-ceiling statute is unconstitutional,
is such a dangerous game.
Beyond the cautionary tale that comes from this possible
series of events, the larger issue is whether the Fed should
continue to exist as an independent policy actor. This really
boils down to the question of whether we want the Fed to be
able to exercise human judgment. Although we would never
want the Fed to be forced to decide whether to rescue the
economy during a debt ceiling standoff, that it could do so
serves as an important example demonstrating the unique role
that the Fed serves in the U.S. political and economic system.
It is precisely when the political branches are incapable of re-
sponding to a crisis-either because of the rush of events, or
because the political process has ground to a halt-that we
would most need a politically independent Fed to do what oth-
erwise could not be done.
IV
JUSTIFYING FED INDEPENDENCE
We have just seen the value of Fed independence in a cri-
sis-both a recent real one and a potential near-future one. Yet
the Fed acts as an independent agency in normal times as well
as during crises. Can Fed independence be justified in normal
times?
In our view, during the years since the financial crisis the
Fed made better macroeconomic policy choices than the politi-
cal branches did. Whereas the latter deployed expansionary
fiscal policy too timidly during the crisis and then pivoted to
deficit reduction well before the economy had fully recovered,
the Fed pursued an aggressive, expansionary monetary pol-
icy.1 6 6 Yet the fact that an expert agency pursues better poli-
166 MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30354, MONETARY POLICY AND THE
FEDERAL RESERVE: CURRENT POLICY AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 13-17 (2015).
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cies than those pursued by political actors is not, standing
alone, a sufficient reason to insulate that agency from political
supervision. If it were, then we would have reasons to favor
technocracy presumptively across a wide range of subject mat-
ter areas.
Accordingly, the case for Fed independence in ordinary
times must rest on something beyond the superior substantive
competence of Fed economists relative to elected officials. Con-
ventionally, that something is thought to be the risk that, if
given control over monetary policy, elected officials-especially
the president-will use that control to boost the economy in the
short term so that the voters reward them, even as the best
approach for the long-term health of the economy would be
tighter money. Yet the experience of recent years reverses the
conventional wisdom. More commonly now, elected officials
favor tighter monetary policy than the Fed.167 The conven-
tional justification for Fed independence in normal times ap-
pears to be out of date.
This Part nonetheless defends Fed independence by em-
phasizing that times change. No one thinks that Americans'
generally healthy regard for freedom of speech justifies elimi-
nating the First Amendment, so, likewise, the fact that we live
in a period when the roles of the Fed and political actors are
upside-down does not mean that the traditional relation will
not reappear. A structural defense of institutional indepen-
dence should be based on the long-term incentives of the ac-
tors. In elaborating this point, we draw on an analogy between
an independent judiciary and an independent central bank.
We also emphasize a distinctive justification for Fed indepen-
dence based on our consideration of the Fed's performance in
recent years and its potential role in responding to future cri-
ses.1 68 Fed independence from the political branches of the
government does not merely enable the Fed to check them or to
act on its own. Rather, Fed independence facilitates coopera-
tion with the rest of the government because the Fed can act as
a financial counterparty to the political parts of the government
167 See Matt O'Brien, Why Republicans Are Getting One of the Most Obvious
Things Wrong, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.washington
post. com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11 / 10/why-republicans-are-getting-one-of-
the-most-obvious-things-wrong/ [https://perma.cc/TK5R-8S3R]; see also
Michael Grunwald, Republicans Want Us to Be Europe, TIME (Apr. 3, 2014), http:/
/time.com/490 10/republicans-want-us-to-be-europe/ [https://perma.cc/7YHY-
XPSCI (describing similarities between Republican monetary policies and post-
crisis European austerity measures).
168 See supra Part II.
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(especially the Treasury), in both normal times and emergency
times.
A. From Expertise to Self-Dealing
In an important speech two decades ago, administrative
law scholar Peter Strauss explained how, over time, the chief
rationale for delegation of substantial power to administrative
agencies shifted from expertise-the notion that complex tech-
nical questions call for solutions fashioned by objective ex-
perts-to politics-the recognition that agencies make policy
choices constrained by public input and presidential supervi-
sion. 1 6 9 The leading administrative law doctrine of our era,
Chevron deference, reflects that shift: in the eponymous case,
the Supreme Court sustained the Reagan Administration's
loosening of the emissions rules governing power plants on the
ground that, within the broad linguistic bounds of the relevant
statutory delegation, an agency may (indeed must) make policy
choices, but that ultimate supervision by the president ensures
political accountability for those choices. 1 7 0
To be sure, comparative expertise continues to play a role
in justifying delegation to administrative agencies. When Con-
gress paints with a broad brush, the case law assumes that,
other things being equal, it intends that agency experts rather
than generalist judges will fill in the details.1 7 1
In addition, recent scholarship calls attention to an institu-
tional dimension to agency expertise. In the traditional pic-
169 See Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation ofAmer-
ican Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 755-56 (1996) (describing shift in
1960s and 1970s as reflecting "a general social trend that came to view agencies
less as apolitical 'experts' administering a strictly rational process, and more as
political bodies making choices among alternatives in response to social needs
and political inputs").
170 The Court stated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984), that "an agency to which Congress has delegated
policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly
rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judg-
ments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Exec-
utive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government
to make such policy choices . . . ."
171 See id. ("Judges are not experts in the field . "); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich.
Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2265 n.7 (2011) (explaining, in the course of
deferring to an agency's construction of its own rule that the existence of a "tech-
nical factual dispute" between the parties "simply underscores the appropriate-
ness of deferring [because s]o long as the [agency] is acting within the scope of its
delegated authority and in accordance with prescribed procedures, it has greater
expertise and stands in a better position than this Court to make the technical




ture, courts (and others) would give epistemic deference to
experts because, in virtue of their training and experience, they
know more about the underlying technical issues than the
layperson. The new work on agency expertise supplements
this view of expertise "in the air" by describing how specialized
training and experience interact with a particular institutional
setting. As Matthew Stephenson helpfully summarizes this
perspective using what he himself calls "the jargon of modem
social science, public decisionmakers' expertise about policy
decisions is often endogenous (produced by factors internal to
the legal-institutional system) rather than exogenous (deter-
mined by factors external to, and therefore independent of,
legal-institutional design choices)."1 7 2 In other words, agencies
do not merely collect experts under one roof where they exer-
cise their pre-existing expertise; the agency and its professional
staff co-produce expertise.
This new attention to how agencies produce and exercise
expertise arguably justifies restoring some of the lost luster of
expertise as a justification for both delegation of authority to
agencies and judicial deference to agency decision-making. At
the same time, however, the factors that Strauss identified as
leading to the earlier shift from expertise to politics have hardly
disappeared. Agencies remain susceptible to capture by the
industries they regulate, 7 3 and many decisions delegated to
agencies involve trading off values that are matters of political
contestation. Perhaps the most that can be said is that the
case for delegation and deference to agencies rests on an un-
certain and context-dependent mix of expertise and politics.
We take no position on the precise proportions of that mix
in any given setting or more broadly. Our point here is that,
whatever the mix in any particular context, something extra
must be offered to justify structuring an agency to be relatively
independent of political oversight. In principle, that something
could be the extraordinarily technical nature of the underlying
subject matter, but in practice, that sort of justification cannot
explain the haphazard pattern of supervision that Congress
has in fact devised. Indeed, there is not even agreement on
which agencies count as independent 7 4 or whether one can
172 Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1426 (2011).
173 See Strauss, supra note 169, at 756 (describing risk of capture as part of
the process by which agency decision-making came to be seen as political).
174 See MIROSLAVA SCHOLTEN, THE POLICAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF EU AND US INDE-
PENDENT REGUIATORY AGENCIES 200-01 (2014) (noting that "no general definition of
'independent regulatory agency' exists" but nonetheless listing sixteen such agen-
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sensibly draw a sharp distinction between independent and
executive-branch agencies.175
But even treating "independence" as a matter of degree
rather than kind, it is plain that the degree to which the rele-
vant regulatory subject matter calls for technical skill cannot,
by itself, explain why Congress chooses to make some agencies
more or less politically accountable. For example, environmen-
tal regulation requires extraordinarily complex scientific judg-
ments, yet the Administrator and deputy Administrators of the
Environmental Protection Agency are political appointees
heading an agency within the executive branch. 76 Likewise,
the Energy Department, which has responsibility for many
highly technical matters,1 77 is an executive agency. At the
same time, however, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have the usual
indicia of independent agencies.17 8
Thus, the technical skill needed to regulate an area cannot
have been the decisive criterion in Congress's decisions
whether to make particular agencies subject to direct political
control versus relatively independent. And accordingly, the
need for technical expertise does not provide a sufficient expla-
cies based on the list set forth by statute, 44 U.S.C. § 3502, and objective indicia
of independence such as "multi-member management boards, bipartisan criteria
for appointment and the removal 'for cause' restriction"). But see Note, The SEC Is
Not an Independent Agency, 126 HARV. L. REv. 781, 785-93 (2013) (arguing that
members of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which appears on Schol-
ten's list of independent agencies, do not enjoy for-cause dismissal protection and
that the Commission is thus not independent).
175 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEx. L. REv. 15, 17 (2010) (arguing that "conventional
discussion of administrative law and agency design has overlooked [the fact] that
the traditional metrics for an independent agency" ignore various structural
means of insulating agencies); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing
Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CoRNELL L. REv. 769, 825-27
(2013) (finding that no list of functional criteria satisfactorily distinguishes execu-
tive from independent agencies and concluding that independence should be
regarded as a multi-factor matter of degree); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of
Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REv. 1163, 1165 (2013) (arguing that "un-
written political norms" or "conventions," rather than criteria such as insulation
of agency personnel from removal by the president, define which agencies are
"independent").
176 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2012) (prescribing standards
for water quality and implementation plans); see also, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 130.7
(2016) (identifying the total maximum daily loads (TMDL) and individual water
quality-based effluent limitations).
177 For example, the Department of Energy has responsibility for managing
nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. See Nuclear Security & Nonprouferation,
ENERGY.GOV, http://energy.gov/public-services/national-security-safety/nu-
clear-security-nonproliferation [https://perma.cc/8H2J-TJBZ].
178 See SCHOLTEN, supra note 174, at 200.
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nation for the Fed's independence. Yes, regulation of the
macro-economy through the purchase and sale of financial as-
sets requires considerable technical expertise, but certainly not
more technical expertise than the sorts of tasks undertaken by
some more politically accountable agencies.
In any event, strictly as a normative matter, the need for
expertise should not suffice as a reason for an agency's inde-
pendence from political oversight. To justify creating an inde-
pendent agency, Congress should have some special reason
beyond subject matter difficulty. Otherwise, given the com-
plexity of just about everything, Congress would be justified in
delegating nearly all regulation to independent agencies.
We recognize that virtually no body of constitutional doc-
trine governs the question of when Congress can, and when it
cannot, delegate power to an independent as opposed to an
executive-branch agency. The issue arises, if at all, only indi-
rectly, typically in cases challenging congressional restrictions
on the president's power to remove officers wielding govern-
ment power. 1 7 9 Yet those cases make no serious effort to dis-
tinguish between the sorts of responsibilities that can be
assigned to agency officials who are relatively insulated from
political pressure and those that must be entrusted to officials
directly answerable to the president. 180
Accordingly, when we ask whether Fed independence can
be justified, we do not mean to inquire whether Fed indepen-
dence is constitutionally permissible. Under the current doc-
trine, the answer to that question is pretty clearly yes. Perhaps
the doctrine ought to be modified so that, in Gillian Metzger's
turn of phrase, the president has a "duty to supervise" the
administrative state.18 1 If so, that duty might be calibrated to
take account of the particular mission and characteristics of
each of the various agencies of government.
For present purposes, however, our task is sufficiently
complicated even when we employ the simplifying assumption
179 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 495-98 (2010) (invalidating double level of for-cause protection for members
of board created by Sarbanes-Oxley Act); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-96
(1988) (upholding restrictions on removal of independent counsel).
180 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), which invalidated restrictions
on the president's power to fire a postmaster, is an exception, as the Court there
reasoned that all principal officers exercising executive power must be subject to
direct presidential removal, but the logic of Myers has not been followed in subse-
quent cases. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 723-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181 Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J.
1836, 1842-43 (2015) (rooting such a duty in the Take Care Clause and separa-
tion of powers, notwithstanding worries about judicial competence).
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that there are just two kinds of agencies: executive agencies
that answer to the president and independent agencies that are
less directly accountable to political oversight. Any plausible
classificatory scheme would put the Fed in the second cate-
gory. Accordingly, when we ask whether Fed independence is
justified we mean simply whether Congress had a good reason
for thinking that the Fed needs the kind of independence it
enjoys 82-that is, whether the Fed is special in some way.
This is why, in order to avoid the slippery slope to technocracy
tout court, a good answer would have to point to something
other than the expertise of Fed economists.
The standard answer in the literature on the Fed (and cen-
tral banks more generally) is the risk that politicians will ma-
nipulate the money supply for short-term political ends at the
expense of long-term economic health.1 33 In the United States,
the clearest example is the pressure that President Richard
Nixon applied to Fed Chair Arthur Burns.1 84 That Nixon was
able to apply such pressure notwithstanding the Fed's institu-
tional insulation only underscores the danger we would face if
the Fed were subject to more direct political control.
The next subpart raises questions about the continuing
vitality of this justification for Fed independence, but for now
we note that it bears a strong structural resemblance to the
standard justification for an independent judiciary with the
power of judicial review. Constitutions mark the boundaries of
government's authority-whether at the border of other
branches or levels of government or of individual rights-and
so there is a risk of self-dealing if the very government officials,
whose actions a constitution constrains, have final authority
182 We mean independence from the president and Congress. Rachel Barkow
has argued that insulating agencies from direct control by political actors can be a
means of avoiding agency capture, that is, of making the agency independent of
the influence of private actors. See Barkow, supra note 175, at 17. We take no
position on whether avoiding capture justifies agency independence, but we do
note that this interest would not appear to provide the "something extra" that we
believe is needed because there is a risk that just about any agency will be
captured. Perhaps, however, some agencies are substantially more vulnerable to
capture than others. If so, this greater susceptibility might warrant
independence.
183 Conti-Brown explains that this picture is widely known through two meta-
phors: Ulysses bound to the mast to resist the sirens' song; and the Fed Chair as
the chaperone who removes the spiked punch bowl just when the party is heating
up. See CoNTI-BROwN, supra note 21, passim (repeatedly referring to the
"Ulysses/punch-bowl" view of Fed independence); id. at 3 (ascribing the punch
bowl metaphor to William McChesney Martin, who served as Fed Chair for nearly
two decades).
184 Burton A. Abrams, How Richard Nixon Pressured Arthur Burns: Evidence
from the Nixon Tapes, 20 J. EcoN. PERSP. 177, 177-79 (2006).
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over the meaning of the constitution. That risk is perhaps least
tolerable when, in John Hart Ely's memorable phrase, "the ins
are choking off the channels of political change to ensure that
they will stay in and the outs will stay out."' 8 5
Ely's justificatory account of judicial review by an indepen-
dent judiciary translates to the Fed quite tightly. If left to their
own devices, incumbent presidents-the ins-will use the
levers of monetary policy to stay in and to keep challengers out.
The worry also applies to a second-term president, who would
be tempted to froth up the economy in the hope of aiding in the
election of a successor from the same political party.
In at least one way, Ely's worry about the ins favoring their
political interests over the interests of the public in general
carries even greater urgency with respect to monetary policy by
the Fed than with respect to judicial review by an independent
judiciary. Politicians unconstrained by Ely-style representa-
tion-reinforcing judicial review will have incentives to rig the
political process to give themselves an electoral advantage.
Consequently, any policy chosen by the resulting unrepresent-
ative government officials can be said to be bad on process
grounds, but the rigging of the system will not systematically
lead to substantively bad policy. By contrast, the rigging of
monetary policy to benefit incumbents will not only distort
electoral results, but will also systematically yield bad policy
outcomes because it will bias monetary policy in favor of loose
credit, even when tighter credit would be the preferable course
on strictly economic grounds. These two concerns-the risk of
self-dealing and the tendency of such self-dealing to lead to bad
monetary policy-together provide the something extra that we
have said is needed to justify Fed independence.
To be sure, "self-dealing" is a relative term. In some sense
anything the government does carries a risk of some sort of
self-dealing. For example, if the government borrows irrespon-
sibly to fund short-term consumption rather than long-term
investment, that choice can benefit incumbents because only
the satiated consumers of the here and now vote in the next
election. Or the president (with or without congressional au-
thorization or acquiescence) can wage an unnecessary war to
create a rally-round-the-flag effect that benefits his or her party
185 ELY, supra note 27, at 103. Ely described political malfunction justifying
judicial intervention as occurring either when the ins abuse their power to hold it
or when "representatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically dis-
advantaging some minority out of simple hostility or . . . prejudice[ I." Id. We
focus here on the former rationale.
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in the next election, while imposing future costs on service
members, their families, taxpayers, and the general public
whose security may be undermined by later blowback.
Nonetheless, the risks of self-dealing with respect to mone-
tary policy are sufficiently different in degree from some other
risks of self-dealing to warrant treating them as different in
kind. The irresponsible use of monetary policy poses a risk of
catastrophic harm, as the history of countries that have exper-
ienced hyperinflation confirms. Most other sorts of self-deal-
ing-such as pork barrel spending-may be wasteful and
foolish, but do not risk catastrophe.
To be sure, there are risks of catastrophic harm in some
other domains. To stick with the clearest example, the use of
military force may pose the risk of escalation to nuclear war.
The decision to abandon policies favoring alternative energy
and instead to tap some potent carbon-based resource could
tip the balance towards irreversible and catastrophic climate
change. Accordingly, if we were designing American public in-
stitutions from scratch, we might conclude that one or more of
the agencies responsible for policy in these areas ought to be
insulated from direct political control as well. An "independent
military" is certainly a conceptual possibility. 186
However, we are not designing our institutions from
scratch. The Commander-in-Chief clause of the Constitution
we have plainly requires that the military be subject to direct
presidential control. Moreover, even if the Constitution did not
rule out an independent military, the risk of catastrophic harm
from self-dealing by political actors in the military context must
be weighed against other risks. A military not subject to direct
political control could increase the risk of a coup d'etat. Even
apart from that risk, on the whole, political accountability of
the military may actually reduce the risk of catastrophic harm.
The Framers' distrust of standing armies18 7 and the decision to
give Congress a role in the decision to go to war-together with
the Kantian observation that democracies rarely go to war, at
186 Cf SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE 83-84 (1957) (assert-
ing that the state should encourage "an independent military sphere" so that
"multifarious civilian groups" do not "maximize their power in military affairs" by
involving the military in political activity).
187 The concern loomed largest among Anti-Federalists. See, e.g., THE ANTI-
FEDERALIST No. 24 (Brutus), reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS 62, 62 (Morton
Burden ed., 1965) ("Standing armies are dangerous to the liberties of a people.").
The Framers responded by acknowledging the dangers of standing armies but
denying that the Constitution would lead to a standing army. See, e.g., THE
FEDERALIST Nos. 8, 26, 29 (Alexander Hamilton).
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least against each other's1 -provide reasons to think that an
independent military would be, on net, harmful.
Meanwhile and conversely, there is yet another reason for
thinking that monetary policy in the hands of directly politi-
cally accountable actors would be especially vulnerable to the
risk of self-dealing. More than almost any other policy area
with systemic effects, monetary policy is opaque to ordinary
Americans. If a president "wags the dog" by engaging in politi-
cally motivated war, or Congress promotes the coal industry,
what is happening will be clear enough to anyone paying atten-
tion. By contrast, manipulation of monetary policy can often
fly under the public's radar, especially given the diversity of
opinion about where interest rates should be set at any partic-
ular moment.
In any event, it is not our aim here to show that monetary
policy is uniquely suited for an independent agency. If the sorts
of factors we have identified that justify independence for the
Fed (or other relevant factors) justify the conclusion that, all
things considered, some other agencies also ought to be insu-
lated from direct political control, so be it. Our claim is simply
that something extra should justify independence for any
agency, and that the Fed, more than many agencies operating
in other policy areas, satisfies that requirement because of the
special risks of self-dealing and catastrophe involved in mone-
tary policy if conducted by politicians or people directly ac-
countable to politicians.
Indeed, far from justifying too many independent agencies,
our requirement of a special justification for making an agency
independent might prove problematic for many of the existing
independent agencies. Independence for some agencies per-
haps could be justified on the ground that they address acute
versions of the self-dealing concern. For others, one might en-
list other sorts of reasons, some of which might also apply to
the Fed itself. For example, independent agencies often include
representatives from the private sector in order to attain some
188 See Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), re-
printed in KAI's POLITICAL WRITINGS 93 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbett trans., 1st ed.
1970) (setting forth conditions needed to avoid war, including republican govern-
ment). Modem theorists contest the democratic peace hypothesis. Compare Se-
bastian Rosato, The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory, 97 AM. POL. SC.
REv. 585, 588-89 (2003) (critiquing the democratic peace thesis), with Michael W.
Doyle, Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 463, 463-66 (2005)
(offering a qualified defense of it). Although we agree with Doyle and others that,
ceteris paribus, representative government reduces the risk of war, our point here
is more limited-namely, that a policy maker or constitution writer could reasona-
bly conclude that control of the military by elected officials reduces the risk of war.
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of the advantages of industry self-regulation.1 89 To render an
agency answerable to the private sector, even in part, is neces-
sarily to render it relatively independent of political control.
But whether this or some other sort of justification can be
found for every independent agency is beyond the scope of this
Article.o9 0 Our focus is on the Fed, for which the self-dealing
rationale apparently suffices.
B. Pathology and Spandrels
Or does it? Perhaps the standard justification for Fed inde-
pendence is pass&. No longer do we see the Fed fighting to
maintain the integrity of the currency against a set of profligate
political actors seeking to add temporary froth to the economy
in order to boost their standing with the electorate. Instead, as
we have noted, the current pattern is just the opposite: many
political actors favor tighter monetary policy than the Fed has
pursued. Does this role reversal mean that Fed independence
can no longer be justified?
We think the answer is no, for there is no reason to think
that political actors' current endorsement of monetary (and
fiscal) austerity as the path to prosperity is permanent. Insti-
tutions like a central bank should be designed with an eye
towards the long term, and over the long term the incentives of
political actors could once again unduly bias them towards
short-term easy money timed to the political cycle at the ex-
pense of long-term growth.
Once again, constitutional law provides a useful analogy.
In an important article three decades ago, Vincent Blasi argued
that in interpreting the First Amendment courts ought to be
guided by what he called
189 For a cautious endorsement of the advantages of self-regulation in some
contexts, see Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 373-88 (1998) (discussing statutes that
encourage environmental self-regulation).
190 We also do not address arguments that the Constitution requires all agen-
cies to be subject to the supervision of the president. See, e.g., STEVEN G. CAIA-
BRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM
WASHINGTON TO BUSH 10-21 (2008) (describing the modem constitutional debate
over the "unitary executive"); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 582 (1994) ("The exclu-
sivity of the power granted by the Executive Power Clause confirms our view that
Congress cannot create independent entities under the Constitution. . . ."); David
Casazza, Note, Liberty Requires Accountability: Checking Delegations to Indepen-
dent Agencies, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 729, 740-47 (2015) (arguing that delega-
tions to independent agencies violate the nondelegation doctrine). See also




the pathological perspective. That is, the overriding objective
at all times should be to equip the first amendment to do
maximum service in those historical periods when intoler-
ance of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when govern-
ments are most able and most likely to stifle dissent
systematically. The first amendment, in other words, should
be targeted for the worst of times. 191
Blasi explained that even though pathological periods tend to
be short-lived, they can do lasting damage, and that the body of
free speech doctrine therefore ought to be designed, even in
ordinary times, with pathological periods in mind. 1 9 2 Blasi was
not so naive as to believe that judicial adoption of the patholog-
ical perspective would utterly prevent pathological periods, but
he thought that conscious adoption of the pathological per-
spective during ordinary times "might help to blunt or delay the
impact of some pathological pressures, keep a pathology in
certain bounds, or stimulate the regenerative forces that per-
mit a political community to work its way out of
a pathological period." 193
It is at least arguable that U.S. free speech doctrine-which
is stronger relative to other governmental objectives than free
speech protection in any other country-already incorporates
something like a pathological perspective. Yet, as Geoffrey
Stone has shown, the courts have been powerless to prevent,
and have often acquiesced in, unnecessary curtailments of civil
liberties when the nation felt threatened.1 9 4 To be sure, many
of the episodes Stone details pre-dated modern free speech
doctrine, although the post-9/11 measures did not.
In any event, for our current purposes, we do not need to
take a position on whether matters would have been still worse
had the courts not adopted the pathological perspective in the
First Amendment area or, more broadly, whether Blasi's pre-
scription is sound in its own domain. At the very least, there is
a logic to Blasi's argument that could be true in any given
domain. And that logic translates quite well to monetary
policy.
191 Blasi, supra note 24, at 449-50.
192 See id. at 458 (characterizing as "remote" the possibility that "the best way
to fortify a constitutional regime against pathological challenge is to develop a
strong tradition of adjudication geared to normal times").
193 Id. at 459.
194 See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE
SEDION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 4-13 (2004) (describing the U.S.
curtailment of civil liberties in response to perceived threats as overreactions).
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Whereas Blasi offered the pathological perspective as an
attitude for judges construing the First Amendment, legislators
and constitution writers can also take the pathological per-
spective in designing institutions. Indeed, one might think of a
judicially enforceable bill of rights as the product of constitu-
tion writers (or amenders) who have taken the pathological
perspective. The sort of polity likely to produce a bill of rights
that is meant to be taken seriously (by contrast with the rights
protections one sees in sham constitutions) 1 9 5 will generally be
one that, in normal times, is inclined to respect rights even
without the bill of rights. Although Justice Scalia surely over-
stated the point when he averred that the whole point of a bill of
rights is to fortify a society's deep commitments against the
possibility that those commitments may be cast aside in a fu-
ture crisis, 9 6 that is certainly part of what a bill of rights
does. 197
The same sort of argument justifies Fed independence even
in an era when the political branches favor tighter monetary
policy than the Fed does. So long as politicians can manipulate
the money supply to favor their short-term interests at the
expense of the economy's long-term health, an institutional
designer who takes the pathological perspective will seek to
insulate the central bank from direct political oversight, so as
to minimize that risk. Just as Blasi noted that robust patho-
logically-oriented free speech doctrine will not be sufficient to
prevent all overreactions against civil liberties, so too, an inde-
pendent Fed will not stand up to all political pressure, as the
Nixon/Bums episode illustrates. But just as the pathological
perspective on free speech can nonetheless be defended on the
ground that it may reduce the likelihood and severity of periods
of unwarranted invasions of civil liberties, so taking the patho-
logical perspective by designing an independent Fed can be
justified on the ground that it reduces the likelihood of political
actors bullying the Fed into unwisely increasing the money
195 See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALiF. L. REv.
863, 897-912 (2013) (comparing the rights-protective elements of constitutions
with the human rights records of governments).
196 See Antonin Scalia, Conmon-Law Courts in a Civll-Law Systern: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MAT-
TER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 40-41 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (describing the purpose
of a constitution as a hedge against the possibility that the society will "rot").
197 See Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1631, 1633 (2009) (acknowledging that "constitutional rights" sometimes "en-
trench deep values against future backsliding" even though they "are typically
established as the culmination of a struggle to change the status quo, rather than
to enshrine well-accepted fundamental values").
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supply when the best long-term economic analysis would call
for a tight monetary policy.
We would add, moreover, that our concern about self-deal-
ing-with preventing the "ins" from abusing policymaking
power to stay in office and to oust their opponents from the
offices that the more powerful "ins" currently do not hold-also
justifies a concern that politicians could manipulate monetary
policy toward inappropriate tightening, as well as easing. As
we described above, the classic concern is that incumbents will
pump up the economy in order to win elections, but it is in fact
possible that politicians could instead decide to strangle the
economy as a short-term political maneuver.
Why would a politician want to harm the economy? A long
line of political science research has found that, at least in the
United States and Britain, the incumbent party's electoral fate
is all but sealed by the direction that the economy is taking in
the months immediately preceding the election.19 8 That is, it is
not a question of whether times are good or bad, but whether
the economy is getting better or worse before an election. This
means that a savvy politician could decide to manufacture a
recession early in her term, in order to set the stage for the
economy to experience a robust recovery as the next election
looms. President Carter, in fact, was criticized for political na-
ivet6, by essentially running this strategy in reverse. He nomi-
nated a Fed chairman in 1979, Paul Volcker, who immediately
instituted severe monetary contraction, which meant that
Carter and his party faced the electorate in 1980 while presid-
ing over a weakening economy.19 9
We take no position on whether this reductionist view of
economic cause and political effect is true or false. Instead, we
simply note that some incumbents could believe that it is true,
and if those politicians had the ability to control or unduly
influence monetary policy, they would have the means and
motive to use contractionary monetary policy for political ends,
198 See RAY C. FAIR, PREDICTING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND OTHER THINGS 47-55
(2d ed. 2012); Robert S. Erikson, Economic Conditions and the Presidential Vote,
83 AM. POL. Scl. REv. 567, 567-70 (1989); Michael S. Lewis-Beck et al., The
Compleat Economic Voter: New Theory and British Evidence, 43 BRIT. J. POL. SCI.
241, 253-61 (2012); Gregory B. Markus, The Impact of Personal and National
Economic Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis,
32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 137, 142-51 (1988).
199 Ann Mari May, Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy, and the Carter Presidency, 23
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 699, 708 (1993) (describing the "massive contraction in late
1979 and early 1980" due to Fed policy, which only turned expansionary in mid-
1980, when it was too late to have much effect in time for the presidential
election).
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in much the same way that one would usually worry about the
inappropriate use of expansionary monetary policy.
Furthermore, the existence of divided government (that is,
of one party controlling the presidency, while the other party
controls one or both houses of Congress) raises the possibility
that one party or the other could exploit a non-independent
monetary policy to manufacture pre-election downturns as well
as upturns. 2 0 0 For example, in late 2010, Republican Senator
Mitch McConnell famously said: "The single most important
thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-
term president." 2 0 1 There is some controversy over whether
McConnell was saying baldly that he would oppose the presi-
dent no matter what, or instead that he merely meant to say
that enacting the Republicans' substantive agenda was contin-
gent on Obama's losing his reelection bid in 2012.202 Even on
the more generous reading, however, the point is that McCon-
nell wanted Obama to lose the next election. And if monetary
policy had been under congressional control-even as a matter
of creating stasis, as the Republicans succeeded in doing with
regard to fiscal policy after 2010-the danger would have exis-
ted that monetary policy would also have been used to generate
an unfavorable political environment for the president in 2012.
Therefore, even in a world where the politicians currently
favor tighter monetary policy than the Fed does, they could
abuse non-independent monetary policymaking as a way to
manipulate political outcomes. Although we view the patholog-
ical perspective as sufficient to justify an independent Fed even
in an age of austerity, we also can see that the concern about
self-dealing is justified even in the current environment.
To say that the pathological perspective ultimately justifies
Fed independence, however, is not to deny the value of an
200 The party that believed its opponents would be blamed for a weakening
economy would have a motive to favor monetary contraction. Usually, the fate of
the president's party is thought to depend on the economy, which would give the
other party's congressional leaders reason to sink the economy. Where that is not
the case, the president would have the motive to impose contractionary policies
late in her term, rather than earlier, so that (by hypothesis), her political oppo-
nents in Congress pay the political price.
201 Glenn Kessler, When Did McConnell Say He Wanted to Make Obana a
"One-Term President"?, WASH. Posr (Sep. 25, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/fact-checker/post/when-did-mcconnell-say-he-wanted-to-make-
obama-a-one-term-president/2012/09/24/79fd5cd8-0696-11 e2-afff-d6c7f
20a83bf blog.html [https://perma.cc/VC2S-A6NUI (reprinting in full an inter-




independent Fed in ordinary times. Here too we can usefully
analogize to an independent judiciary.
Various normative theories of judicial review extend to
some but not all of the domain of judicial enforcement of the
Constitution. For example, Jesse Choper has argued that judi-
cial enforcement of the Constitution's federalism and separa-
tion-of-powers norms creates unnecessary friction with the
political branches and that the courts should therefore spend
their precious capital on protecting individual rights, where
counter-majoritarianism finds its strongest justification. 2 0 3 At
the same time, however, Choper does not maintain that the
courts act illegitimately when they enforce federalism and sepa-
ration-of-powers norms. 20 4 Likewise, even as Ely built a theory
that justified judicial review to reinforce democracy and protect
minority rights, he allowed that the courts can also enforce
textual provisions that do neither. 205
In acknowledging that judicial review can be legitimately
exercised across a broader range of cases than those that fall
within its core justification, both Choper and Ely were recog-
nizing a basic truth about law and institutions. Just as laws
are necessarily over- and under-inclusive with respect to their
background justifications, 2 06 so an institution may be designed
with one purpose in mind, but peculiar features of that design
allow it to function well-or poorly-in other settings. Where
the design feature is otherwise advantageous, we might borrow
a term from architecture and call it a spandrel; where the de-
sign feature proves disastrous for some unanticipated reason
we might borrow a term from literature and call it a Franken-
stein's monster. 20 7
In our view, the fact that the Fed has been able to minimize
the damage done by insufficiently expansionary fiscal policy
since the 2008 economic crisis through loose monetary policy
is a happy accident-a byproduct of Fed independence that has
been designed to serve a very different purpose. We recognize,
however, that people who worry that the Fed's "debasing" of the
203 JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLCAL PROCESS
169-70 (1980).
204 See id. at 381.
205 See ELY, supra note 27, at 76 (accepting that "positive law has its claims,
even when it doesn't fit some grander theory").
206 See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 25 (1991).
207 Michael C. Dorf, Spandrel or Frankenstein's Monster? The Vices and Virtues
of Retrofitting in American Law, 54 WM. & MARY L. REv 339 (2012) (arguing that
numerous features of American law currently serve purposes for which they were
not originally devised).
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currency means that runaway inflation is just around the cor-
ner would regard the Fed's use of its independence over the
recent period as a very unhappy accident.
If we shared the view of the economic austerians, 208 we
would worry that the recent tendency of the Fed to keep inter-
est rates low calls into question the wisdom of continuing to
allow the Fed to act independently. An austerian might still
favor Fed independence, however, if she thought that its bene-
fits in pathological circumstances outweighed the harms it in-
flicts when the Fed's conduct of monetary policy is more
expansionary (and thus, to an austerian, dangerous) than the
monetary policy favored by political actors. That would be a
complex predictive judgment, which could come out the other
way. Because we are not austerians, however, to us the
calculus looks quite different. The pathological perspective
provides the "something extra" needed to justify Fed indepen-
dence. The happy accident that in normal times Fed indepen-
dence currently leads to better monetary policy than our era's
politics would otherwise appear to allow is simply an added
bonus.
C. An Insider/Outsider Role
In our view, the foregoing analysis suffices to justify Fed
independence even in an age when political actors favor tight
monetary policy. Nonetheless, we would call attention to one
additional benefit of Fed independence that may be sufficiently
substantial as to count as a freestanding justification for Fed
independence. Because of the Fed's status as a governmental
entity that is not fully answerable to the political branches, it
can act as a credible purchaser of government debt. As we
described in detail in Part III, that is a useful function in ordi-
nary times and a potentially economy-rescuing function during
a crisis.
As we have explained, in a liquidity crisis, a central bank
serves the vital role of lender of last resort. In a sovereign debt
crisis, a distinctly national central bank serves another func-
tion. Recent debt crises in Europe illustrate the point by nega-
208 "Austerian" is a neologism for the view that tight monetary policy during an
economic downturn will have a stimulative effect. It playfully combines "auster-
ity" and "Austrian," the latter in reference to "Austrian," that is, Hayekian or anti-
Keynesian, economics. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Bully for the Baltics?, N.Y. TIMES:
THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (Sept. 24, 2011, 9:31 AM), http://krugman.blogs.
nytimes.com/2011/09/24/bully-for-the-baltics/ [https://perma.cc/D7RS-




tive example. Most prominently Greece-but also other
countries struggling to repay sovereign debt-would have a
ready solution if they had borrowed in their own currency: they
could simply increase the money supply, thereby devaluing the
currency, and effectively reducing the value of the debt to levels
that could be repaid. To be sure, such a course carries its own
rather serious risks, which partly explains why Greece has not
(yet) simply abandoned the euro or exited the European Union
(EU), but the decision to retain the euro and stay within the EU
was undoubtedly influenced by other factors as well.
First and most obviously, because Greece borrowed in eu-
ros, a return to and devaluation of the drachma would not by
itself affect its debt level. 2 0 9 A country with its own currency
and central bank has the advantage of borrowing in its own
currency, but once it has accumulated debt in another cur-
rency, switching to a national currency does not automatically
convert the debt. Thus "Grexit"210 can only be accomplished by
a default (or a negotiated haircut) on debt owed in euros, with
an attendant increased cost of obtaining future credit. 2 1 1
Second, restarting a national currency would entail sub-
stantial transition costs. As soon as people learned of an im-
pending currency shift, many of them would seek to withdraw
their euros from Greek financial institutions before their money
was converted into drachmas of uncertain and likely declining
value. Bank runs would result. Indeed, something very much
like this happened in Greece in the summer of 2015 when a
Grexit began to be taken seriously as a possibility. 2 12
And finally, it appears that Greece faced the possibility of
political and national security consequences if it abandoned
the euro.2 1 3 Thus, the fact that no Grexit has (yet) occurred
209 Leslie Shaffer, Why the Drachma Can't Save Greece: Goldman, CNBC (Mar.
3, 2015, 11:35 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/03/03/why-the-drachma-cant
-save-greece-goldman.html [https://perma.cc/Y7J5-QAMM].
210 "Grexit" is a neologism signaling the idea of Greece's exit from the Euro
area. It was coined by economists Willem Buiter & Ebrahim Rahbari, Global
Economics View: Rising Risks of Greek Euro Area Exit CITIGROUP (Feb. 6, 2012),
http://willembuiter.com/Citi44.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHS6-BVDH].
211 Countries that default on their sovereign debt are not forever banished
from credit markets but, ceteris paribus, they pay an interest premium. See
generally ODETTE LIENAU, RETHINKING SOVEREIGN DEBT (2014) (finding little histori-
cal evidence for a categorical norm punishing sovereigns for all defaults).
212 See Robert Peston, Greek Banks 'Days Away from Running Out of Cash,'
BBC NEWS: BusiNEss (July 5, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-
33403008 [https://perma.cc/U5RQ-47J6].
213 See Naftall Bendavid & Katerina Voutsina, Possible Greek Exit from
Eurozone Sparks Wider Geopolitical Concerns, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2015, 7:10 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/possible-greek-exit-from-eurozone-sparks-wider-
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hardly shows that Greece would not have been better off had it
never abandoned the drachma for the euro in the first place.
The Greek case illustrates the value of a national central
bank when a country desperately needs credit, but it does not
show that the central bank must be independent. On the con-
trary, one might think that it shows the value of a central bank
that does the bidding of the elected leaders of the government.
From the Greek perspective, the problem with the European
Central Bank in the current era is that it is too independent of
the government of Greece.
It does not follow, however, that a central bank should be
subject to direct political control. For one thing, as we argued
above, the pathological perspective warrants some degree of
independence to address the structural risk of self-dealing.
Moreover, even in a sovereign debt crisis, independence is
valuable.
Consider the debt-ceiling scenario we discussed in Part III.
The immediate impact of a Fed policy of buying technically
illegal bonds would be to enable the government to pay its bills
and thus to avoid defaulting on its legal obligations; buying
those bonds buys time for the political actors to come to their
senses.
But a Fed policy of buying such bonds would also have a
second, arguably more important, impact. It would calm finan-
cial markets. Seeing the Fed purchasing the new bonds would
reassure holders of existing (pre-crisis) bonds that their assets
remain valuable. The policy would thus prevent a massive sell-
off of Treasuries that would further raise the government's cost
of borrowing and might even threaten the status of the dollar as
a reserve currency.
Crucially, however, the Fed can only play this market-pac-
ification role if the Fed is seen as a credible, responsible actor.
Independence greatly strengthens that perception. Imagine
how markets would react if a politically controlled central bank
were to buy new bonds in a debt-ceiling crisis. Seeing that the
administration's "own" central bank was complicit in the issu-
ance of debt-ceiling-violating bonds, markets would hardly be
geopolitical-concems-1436440251 [https://perma.cc/KZ7S-9CMZ; Maria Pe-
trakis, Keeping Greece in the Euro May Have Nothing to Do with Finances, BLOOM-
BERG BUSINESS (June 11, 2015, 7:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-06-11 /keeping-greece-in-the-euro-may-have-nothing-to-do-with-
finances [https://perma.cc/D55W-Q9ZI; Nicholas Sambanis & loannis Galari-





reassured of the real value of those bonds. Precisely because
the actual Fed is insulated from political control, it can act as a
credible counterparty to the government when the government
issues debt.
The point is easiest to see in a crisis, but it also holds true
in ordinary times. As we explained above, money itself has no
inherent value; it derives its value from the fact that everyone
expects everyone else to treat it as valuable. 2 14 A central bank
that acts independently of the political branches of government
can credibly signal to the public that the money (whether in the
form of currency or bonds) the government issues indeed has
value. A central bank that is-and is therefore perceived as-a
mere tool of the political branches of government can make no
such commitment.
Finally, the Fed's political independence is also essential to
allow it to fulfill its key function as the agency that adjusts
monetary policy in response to the political branches' changes
in fiscal policy. A common view among economists is that, in
normal times, the Fed should adjust monetary policy to offset
the expansionary or contractionary effects of fiscal policy. For
example, when politicians decide that it is a good idea to reduce
annual deficits or to run surpluses and thus pay down some of
the government's debt, the associated government spending
cuts or tax increases acting on their own would tend to shrink
the economy. If the Fed has room to cut interest rates, how-
ever, 215 it can prevent the economy from contracting in re-
sponse to the fiscal consolidation.
Crucially, if the Fed were not independent, it would be
much more difficult to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies,
and to guarantee to all relevant decision makers that the
amount and timing of the offsetting policy changes will be car-
ried out without political interference. But if the Fed can credi-
bly guarantee to wavering members of Congress, who might
otherwise worry that their votes for tax increases or spending
cuts could result in job losses, that monetary policy will be
used to offset those effects, it would be easier for those mem-
bers of Congress to vote for fiscal contraction. Although there
are plenty of situations in which particular tax increases or
spending cuts might be unwise, the Fed's ability to remove
macroeconomic concerns from the conversation allows the po-
214 See supra text accompanying notes 49-56.
215 It was precisely because the Fed had already cut interest rates to zero in
2008 that the fiscal austerity policies were so damaging in the U.S. and Europe.
See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 138.
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litical branches to discuss fiscal policy matters on their own
merits. If, for example, the country were emerging from a se-
vere recession in which the government had instituted fiscal
measures that were intended to be temporary, the Fed's inde-
pendence would ease the transition back to normal operations,
thus preventing otherwise unnecessary temporary spending
programs from becoming effectively permanent.
Similarly, if the political branches were to determine that
there should be a large increase in spending (for example, a
multiyear program to rebuild the nation's infrastructure), there
might be serious concern that such an expansionary fiscal pol-
icy could generate inflation. Knowing that the Fed would pre-
vent that from happening would again allow politicians to
evaluate such a policy only on its merits or demerits.
In short, even the political branches have good reason to
want the Fed not to be a tool of those same political branches.
Just as it is important to the health of the financial system (and
ultimately, therefore, to the overall economy) that the public
not view the Fed as being part of the political mix, it is impor-
tant that the politicians themselves know that their decisions
on fiscal policy will be paired with appropriately non-politicized
monetary policy decisions. Only an independent Fed can credi-
bly make such a guarantee.
CONCLUSION
In response to repeated market panics in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, Congress created the Federal
Reserve System in 1913 to serve as the nation's central bank.
The Fed's core function is to be the "lender of last resort," that
is, to intervene when market contagions create runs on banks
and to counter other market pathologies that could, if un-
checked, threaten the viability of the entire financial system
and thus the economy. Because of the surpassing importance
of that core function, Congress granted the Fed substantial
independence in setting policy and in implementing the market
interventions that it deems necessary. Being the lender of last
resort, in turn, requires the Fed either to set monetary policy
after a crisis has passed (to offset its actions during the crisis),
or at least to coordinate with any other entity that Congress
might endow with the power to set monetary policy (including
Congress itself). Congress wisely chose to give the Fed that
power directly.
The Fed's performance during and after the 2008 market
collapse was exemplary. It was not only the Fed's political in-
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dependence that allowed it to succeed; in addition, its func-
tional and perceived position as being "outside the government"
allowed the Fed to calm the markets and rescue the economy
from what could have become a second Great Depression. The
extent of the Fed's actions in the 2008 crisis, and the inability
of any other public or private entity to intervene successfully in
the crisis, made Congress's decisions in setting up the Fed as a
powerful entity freed from day-to-day political considerations
look prescient.
Nonetheless, the Fed's recent actions have led to vitupera-
tive attacks on its independence. This is hardly the first time
that the Fed or its predecessors have been targeted, but the
current round of attacks has included extreme calls to inject
political considerations into the Fed's decision-making and at-
tempts to intimidate Fed decision makers to set aside their own
best judgment in favor of the Fed's attackers' policy
preferences.
In this Article, we have argued that the Fed should not be
rendered more directly accountable to political actors. The very
real possibility of a near-future crisis that would be caused by
the political branches' failure to increase the federal debt ceil-
ing shows how the Fed's unique structure makes it the only
actor that could minimize the damage in such a crisis, both
because of the Fed's ability to act as lender of last resort and its
power to act exactly when needed. We also warn, however, that
pushing the Fed into the role of last-minute savior in such a
crisis risks exposing it to accusations that it has taken sides in
a political conflict. In proving that its political independence is
essential, the Fed might endanger that very independence.
Even if we are wrong about how that particular hypotheti-
cal crisis would play out, our broader goal is to explain how the
Fed's political independence enables it to act, during good
times as well as bad, as an essential bulwark against policy
making that would harm the financial system and the economy
as a whole. We note that the Fed's "insider-outsider" role pro-
vides the latitude for the Fed to take actions that would safe-
guard financial markets, whereas any other agency of
government that tried to engage in those same actions would
more likely fail (and possibly even make matters worse).
In addition, drawing an analogy to the Article III judiciary,
we argue that institutional independence is easiest to justify
when it prevents the "ins" from abusing power for political ad-
vantage. We thus show that the Fed's independence protects
the public from politicians' efforts to use the especially tempt-
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ing levers of monetary policy to entrench themselves in power.
We further argue that the Fed's independence allows politi-
cians to undertake policy initiatives with the knowledge that
their actions will not be undermined by politically motivated
activity at the Fed. In both good times and bad, therefore, an
independent-but-ultimately-accountable Federal Reserve is an
essential guardian of both the economy and the political
system.
